



# REPORT ON THE USSR

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# REPORT ON THE USSR

Vol. 1, No. 17, 1989

## ALL-UNION TOPICS

### ECONOMIC POLICY

## More Concern for the Consumer

Philip Hanson

“Acceleration” (*uskoreníe*) was one of Mikhail Gorbachev’s main slogans when he became Party general secretary in 1985, and industrial modernization and investment were given high priority in the particularly ambitious Twelfth Five-Year Plan (1986-90). These were and remain the old-fashioned elements of Gorbachev’s economic policies. The exotic targets for output of advanced equipment by 1990 still officially stand: a fourfold increase in production of machining centers, for example. It has been hard to reconcile this almost Stalinist growth program with radical economic reform and greater attention to the consumer. From the start, Western analysts agreed that the Twelfth Five-Year Plan was not feasible and would overstrain investment resources.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See papers in R. Weichhart (ed.), *The Soviet Economy: A New Course?* Brussels, NATO, 1987; Ed Hewett et al., Douglas Kreshover, and Robert E. Leggett in US Congress Joint Economic Committee, *Gorbachev’s Economic Plan*, Vol. 1, Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1987.

At some point last year, the Soviet leaders seem to have accepted that they had things wrong. Worried by growing shortages of consumer goods and the loss of support that such a situation might bring, they shifted priorities back towards the consumer.

### Real Shift of Resources towards Consumer?

It should be made clear at the very outset that it is anything but easy to pin down exactly what alterations have taken place. Keeping track of changes in Soviet priorities is difficult for two main reasons.

First, the fundamental choices about resource allocation are choices between three end uses of output: consumption (both household and public sector), investment, and defense. Soviet statistics on consumption and investment are problematic, and those on defense expenditure are secret (and would turn out to be problematic even if they were not secret).

Second, while the five-year plans do provide some clues to priorities, it is natural to look for shifts in priorities in the form of departures from the original five-year plan targets; unfortunately, most of the details of the year-by-year sequence of targets that are supposed to be part of the five-year plan are not published. When Soviet officials say that some new target is a departure from what was originally laid down in the five-year plan, it is often impossible to check whether this is really so. In the present case, for example, it is not clear to what extent the growth of investment was originally meant to start from a high level and then slow somewhat during the period 1986-90.

Nevertheless, some assessments can be made. The main shifts in resource allocation in favor of the consumer that have been claimed since the start of 1988 are as follows:

- The transfer of responsibility for supplying equipment for the food and light industries to the defense production sector early in 1988. This involved a switch of previously civilian-sector plants to military-sector ministries—a change of administrative responsibility that did not in itself amount to a transfer of resources. It did, however, also entail drawing senior defense-sector officials and engineers into the planning, management, and design of this civilian equipment, apparently at the expense of military work. There is no indication that this was part of the original five-year plan.
- The conversion of a few production units from military to civilian (mostly consumer-oriented) production.
- New targets for output of consumer goods and services set by a group of decrees last August. These targets were said to be higher than those originally set for 1989 and 1990 in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan.<sup>2</sup> Specifically, they are supposed to add to the original five-year plan: output of 9 billion rubles worth of nonfood consumer goods in 1989 and a further 15 billion rubles worth in 1990 (a later source gives a figure of 19 billion rubles above the five-year plan level for 1989—apparently for the same category<sup>3</sup>); 6.2 billion rubles worth of above-plan paid

<sup>2</sup> John Tedstrom, RL 393/88, "New Measures to Boost the Consumer Goods and Services Sectors," August 29, 1988.

<sup>3</sup> P. Krylov, "Sotsial'naya pereorientatsiya ekonomiki v 1986-1988 gg.," *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 3, 1989, pp. 53-63.

services to the population in 1989, and in 1990 the equivalent of 15-20 percent more than the target set in October, 1985.<sup>4</sup>

- Referring to a measure that overlaps the last two, Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov stated that 280 production units (including units within enterprises, not just complete enterprises) are being "reprofiled" to make consumer goods instead of other items.<sup>5</sup>
- To accommodate these increases, it is said that defense spending and budget-funded investment are being cut in the period 1989-90: defense spending by 14 percent of an unspecified amount, and budget-funded investment by 7.5 billion rubles in 1989 and 8 billion rubles in 1990.<sup>6</sup>
- Substantial new government-backed credits have been offered to Moscow by several West European countries; these are not all being taken up, but those accepted are being earmarked for the import of machinery for the light and food industries.<sup>7</sup>
- It is claimed that the original plan for imports of consumer goods in 1989 has been increased.<sup>8</sup>

The first point to be made about these changes is that they are misleadingly presented as additions to planned increases in consumer welfare that have actually been achieved. In fact, there is little doubt that the Twelfth Five-Year Plan targets for the consumer sector have been badly underfulfilled.

It is true that, officially, production of nonfood consumer goods, total consumption (excluding alcohol), and per capita real income all rose quite strongly in the years 1986-88: by 4.3 percent, 5.4 percent, and 2.7 percent, respectively. Paid services rose 11.2 percent a year.<sup>9</sup> These figures roughly correspond with or are somewhat above the Twelfth Five-Year Plan target rates for the whole of

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Yu. Rytov, "Perestroika: s lyud'mi i dlya lyudei," *Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik*, No. 6, 1989, pp. 1 and 3-4.

<sup>6</sup> Interview with USSR Finance Minister Boris Gostev, *Izvestia*, March 31, 1989, p. 2. On the possible size of the defense cut, see Philip Hanson, "A Defense Spending Mystery," *Report on the USSR*, No. 16, 1989, pp. 18-20.

<sup>7</sup> Interview with Yuri Moskovsky, chairman of the board of Vneshekonombank, *Izvestia*, November 26, 1988, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Reuters*, April 16, 1989, citing a statement by Deputy Minister of Trade Suren Sarukhanov.

<sup>9</sup> Krylov, *op. cit.*

the period 1986-90, but, as CIA analysts noted several years ago, there are usually significant upward biases in reported actual Soviet growth that are not present in the original plan targets, so that plans generally appear to be fulfilled to a greater extent than they really are.

Soviet economists now routinely make the same point. A recent article in the house journal of the State Planning Committee (in the old days, a staid and orthodox publication) accepts that official data grossly underadjust for inflation, including the deterioration of product quality at given prices. Allowing (however notionally) also for worsening shortages, the authors argue that average real incomes have in fact been falling. (They note, incidentally, that there is no adjustment for inflation at all in official measures of either services or the output of cooperatives.)<sup>10</sup>

In addition to the shortfalls in real domestic output for consumption, imports of consumer goods have been cut. The cuts made in these imports in response to the fall in Soviet export earnings were probably not part of the original plan. These cuts reduced imports of consumer goods by about 8 billion rubles at retail prices in the period 1985-87.<sup>11</sup> That is no negligible sum, being equivalent to about 5 percent of nonfood retail sales in 1985. (If the sum quoted refers to both food and nonfood imports, and to an actual cut rather than a cut below a previously planned level, the retail price value can be compared with the [current] foreign trade price value of the reduction, as recorded in the Soviet foreign trade returns. The last was 5.7 billion foreign trade rubles, suggesting an average domestic retail markup on these particular imported consumer goods of only 40 percent.)

All in all, the "additions" to the five-year plan targets for consumption, far from providing more material welfare for Soviet citizens than was envisaged in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, are an effort to halt a deterioration that did not feature in the plan at all.

Whether the changes really provide more resources for consumption than was originally envisaged is another matter. They may or may not, depending on how the deterioration in consumer welfare since 1986 came about. If it happened because the plan allocation of inputs to consumption was too low to support the planned consumer output, the fault was in the plan, and the present priority shifts are a genuine revision of that plan.

<sup>10</sup> L. Zubova, V. Kovnir, and D. Lantsev, "Dinamika real'nykh dokhodov naseleniya," *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 3, 1989, pp. 63-72.

<sup>11</sup> P. Kondrashev, "Potrebitel'sky rynek: spros i predlozhenie," *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 1, 1989, p. 10.

The same would be true if the deterioration was brought about by unforeseen circumstances beyond the planners' control. But if the real incomes of Soviet citizens have declined recently because investment was out of control and investment demand was taking more resources than planned, these "additions" to the Twelfth Five-Year Plan are simply an effort to get back to the original plan. In fact, the problems seem to have stemmed from a mixture of circumstances: overambitious planning and poor implementation, with worsening terms of trade from 1986 onwards and mediocre agricultural results in the years 1987-88 making matters worse.

#### How Large Are Shifts of Resources Involved?

The scale of the shifts in priorities that have been announced seems modest. As the measures do not directly concern agriculture, it is simplest to put them in perspective by relating them to Group B industrial output and to retail sales.

Group B industrial output is that of the food-processing, light (clothing and footwear), and other consumer goods industries. Its total value in 1987 was 222 billion rubles at wholesale prices and 331 billion rubles at retail prices, the difference between the two figures being almost entirely made up by the turnover tax. The split between food, light, and other goods (at retail prices) was 39.9 percent, 26.2 percent, and 33.9 percent.<sup>12</sup> Total output officially grew at 5 percent in 1988 and is set to grow by a further 7 percent this year—the increases being almost certainly measured at wholesale prices. That suggests planned output in 1989 worth 249 billion rubles at wholesale prices—perhaps, 372 billion rubles at retail prices.

It is claimed that the addition to the Twelfth Five-Year Plan target this year is 19 billion rubles.<sup>13</sup> That is probably at retail prices and apparently constitutes some 5 percent of the total planned for 1989. It looks like a significant amount, but that impression seems to be the result of expressing the "addition" in terms of this year's plan. There is some evidence that the plan for 1989, after this addition, will still be little more than the actual amounts in previous years.

Some figures published in January indicate that one large component of Group B industrial output is planned to be little more than it was two years ago. This is Group B industrial output excluding the food and light industries—that is, roughly speaking, durables, which account for a third of Group B industrial output. The value of this year's planned output is 75.3 billion rubles at

<sup>12</sup> Derived from *Narkhoz 87*, pp. 14, 84, 85, and 148.

<sup>13</sup> Krylov, *op. cit.*

wholesale prices,<sup>14</sup> only 2.7 percent more than the 73.3 billion rubles reported for 1987. Moreover, the durables element in Group B industrial output is that most amenable to being quickly boosted (for example, by increasing civilian output from defense industry enterprises). If the 1989 target for this part of Group B output is so very little higher than output in 1987, even with the assistance of concealed inflation, it is hard to believe that recent decisions have genuinely added as much as 5 percent to the original Twelfth Five-Year Plan target for Group B industrial output as a whole for this year. It looks as though some presentational sleight of hand is involved.

A small digression at this point will help to put the role in meeting consumer demand of the defense sector in perspective. *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* gives the value of this year's planned production of consumer goods by seven of the nine military industries. It is 20 billion rubles—a substantial contribution of more than 25 percent to output of consumer goods excluding food and light industry products—constituting about 9 percent of all Group B output at retail prices and about the same share of retail sales. So the contribution of the military sector is significant.

Finally, there is the question of the size of the announced increase in imports of consumer goods. Several Western press reports misinterpreted remarks made by Soviet Deputy Minister of Trade Suren Sarukhanov in mid-April. Sarukhanov said that it had originally been planned to import 32 billion rubles worth of consumer goods this year and that in December the figure had been increased to 37 billion. Taking the figures to refer to consumer imports from the West only and to be in foreign trade prices, some Western press commentaries spoke of an 8-billion-dollar increase in consumer imports from the West. That is impossible, as it would mean that the original amount of consumer imports planned was already some 50 percent higher than all Soviet imports from the West last year.

The figures are almost certainly given at retail prices and refer to imports from all trade partners. The confusion is akin to (though not necessarily of the same order as) that which would arise from treating the New York street value of narcotics as equal to the amount paid to Colombian producers—and assuming that all the drugs came from Colombia. The total value of food, food materials, and nonfood consumer goods, plus textile materials, imported from all partners was, according to the Soviet foreign trade returns, 24.6 billion rubles in foreign trade prices in 1985 and fell to about 19.5 billion rubles in

1988.<sup>15</sup> Thus, the planned import of consumer goods to a value of 32 billion (revised to 37 billion) rubles at retail prices this year probably represents only a marginal increase over 1988, and the "addition" may—very tentatively—be put at 3 billion dollars in foreign trade prices, but not all of it from the West. (See above for evidence about the markup on at least one "basket" of consumer imports.) The addition is probably not being financed by credit to more than a modest extent and may be at the expense of machinery imports.

### Conclusions

The Soviet leaders have made a genuine but small adjustment of priorities in favor of the consumer. This has probably been at the expense of both investment and defense. Investment demand was poorly controlled and excessive, with too many construction projects under way, so some cutback here should not be costly to future growth. The impact on defense is unclear: defense producers were already contributing substantial volumes of consumer goods, and there is little doubt that at least a marginal adjustment has been made here at the expense of military production. On the other hand, the last authoritative Western assessment available suggested that military procurement was still rising at a rate of about 3 percent a year in 1988.<sup>16</sup> It is not yet safe to conclude that this growth has slowed since last year. One factor that inhibits stronger proconsumer measures is the need to control the budget deficit, which was reflected, for example, in Prime Minister Ryzhkov's recent observation that something should be done to improve the lot of the 40 million pensioners and others living on less than 75 rubles a month but that it should probably be done with resources made available by halting increases in other social benefits.<sup>17</sup>

The Soviet leadership's concern about consumer dissatisfaction, combined with a need to curb excess investment demand, has led—perhaps, with arms cuts reducing pressure of defense demands—to some adjustment of priorities in favor of the consumer. The scale of these adjustments seems to be small, but public presentation has dressed them up to look larger. Both the reality and the public relations effort indicate, however, that the Soviet leadership is really worried about the recent failure to boost consumer welfare.

<sup>15</sup> For 1988, see TASS, in English, April 5, 1989.

<sup>16</sup> CIA and DIA report cited in *The New York Times*, April 23, 1988.

<sup>17</sup> Rytov, *op. cit.*

(RL 191/89, April 17, 1989)

## Soviet Agriculture after the March Plenum

Erik Whitlock

TDV İSAM  
Kütüphanesi Arşivi  
No TK/82

Six months have passed since the first announcement of a Soviet agricultural reform centered on leasing arrangements. As time has gone on, the Soviet leadership's conception of the agricultural reform has evolved, acquiring more clarity and coherence. Now, from the discussions that took place and the resolution approved at the Central Committee plenum on March 15 and 16, a fairly good picture can be built up of what the Soviet agricultural system will be like in the next two to three years.<sup>1</sup>

### Peasants as "Masters of the Land"?

Perhaps the most striking feature of the resolution that emerged from the plenum was the pledge "to reinstate peasants as the masters of the land." To accomplish this, the Party has promised to promote leasing arrangements, peasant cooperatives, and private plot production, as well as to give all agricultural enterprises the right to determine what they produce, the quantities they produce, and the customer to whom they sell. At the same time, however, there are a number of crucial qualifications.

First, it is clear that the decision to grant leases and to set up other contractual production subunits will remain primarily in the hands of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and (in practice) in the hands of the Party and state authorities. This is not an auspicious prospect for lessees. The kolkhozes and sovkhozes have gained notoriety in the Soviet press for refusing to cooperate or for concluding contracts on unfavorable terms that exploit their partners.<sup>2</sup>

Second, wider scope for farms to dispose of their produce as they think fit is not scheduled to be implemented until the end of a two-to-three year "transition period." Until then, state orders will continue to cover some 70 percent or more of most basic agricultural commodities. Formally, these state orders are to be voluntary. In the light of past experience, however, and in view of the range of total output covered by the orders and the

availability to farms of more remunerative outlets for grain sales (e.g., collective farm markets and contracts with other state organs), it seems certain that these orders will have to be imposed.

Third, it will not be until the end of this year that the "Law on Leasing" emerges, although a decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On Leasing and Leasing Relations in the USSR" was issued on April 7, 1989. The lack of a favorable legal environment continues to hinder any spontaneous move towards leasing. Indeed, instead of a real, spontaneous shift towards this radically new form of land tenure, there has been a great deal of bureaucratically arranged pseudo-leasing—i.e., giving a new name to old relationships. Officially, the number of kolkhozes and sovkhozes entering leasing arrangements has grown from 15,000 (or 30 percent of the total) in June, 1988, to 18,000 early this year.<sup>3</sup> There is plenty of evidence, however, that these figures are misleading. In many cases, only very small portions of an entire kolkhoz or sovkhoz operation are leased off. Moreover, there is often little difference between the leasing arrangement and the more traditional contract brigade, which leaves very little freedom for deciding what to produce.<sup>4</sup>

### Decentralization of Administrative Decision Making

At the meeting of the Central Committee on January 13 of this year, it became stated policy that the days of the USSR Agroindustrial Committee (Gosagroprom) were numbered.<sup>5</sup> It was no surprise, therefore, that the resolution of the plenum included the elimination of this superministry. It is, however, not clear what sort of organization will replace it. A new State Committee for Food and Purchases is to be created, but the resolution gave

<sup>3</sup> L. Vashchukov and V. Nefedov, "Uskorit' razvitiye agropromyshlennogo kompleksa," *Vestnik suyazi*, No. 1, 1989, p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, the comments by Academician V. A. Tikhonov in "Arenda na sele," *Krasnaya zvezda*, February 16, 1989, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> See Erik Whitlock, "Restructuring the Agro-industrial Complex," *Report on the USSR*, No. 7, 1989, pp. 14-16.

<sup>1</sup> For transcripts of the Central Committee plenum and the resolution on agrarian policy, see *Pravda*, March 16 and 17, 1989, and April 1, 1989, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, "Arendator na korotkom povodke" *Izvestia*, March 4, 1989, p. 1.

<sup>14</sup> *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 1, 1989, p. 10.

no clue what its duties will be. In his report to the plenum, Gorbachev was only slightly more forthcoming in stating that the function of the new administrative organs would be one of service and coordination rather than command and interference.

There was also a reaffirmation of the intention to form local councils, associations, and other management organs elected by labor collectives themselves. More significant perhaps was the pledge to give broader responsibilities to local government in determining prices and tax collection. The ultimate effect of these measures will most likely be to differentiate regionally the forms that agricultural management and production take. Indeed, by such decentralization Gorbachev may have found a way to give both reformers and conservatives what they would like. With regional and local government possessing more supervisory and financial control over farms and with the existing kolkhozes and sovkhozes having decisive control over internal organizational arrangements, regions can "go their own way." The more reformist regions in the Baltic, for example, now have wide scope to develop their *khutory*,<sup>6</sup> whereas more conservative regions can leave their centrally managed rural areas relatively untouched.

#### Continuing Burden of Agriculture on Public Finance

There is no doubt that the confused state of agricultural pricing will persist. After a general increase on January 1, 1990, state procurement prices for some basic commodities will be set for a five-year period, while others (for potatoes, fruit, and vegetables) can be determined more flexibly by contractual agreement. At the same time, the resolution states that retail prices of meat, bread, fish, milk, sugar, butter, and children's foods will remain unchanged for the next two years. Local government organs are allowed to set maximum retail prices for fruit, vegetables, and potatoes. Finally, the resolution commits the government to holding down machinery and other industrial input costs for the farms. Apart from perpetuating shortages of agricultural and industrial goods, this pricing system ensures that the tremendous subsidies to the agricultural sector will continue, if not increase.

The burden of agriculture on the Soviet state budget is illustrated in the table. It should be noted that, throughout the 1980s, the revenue Soviet agriculture has received from sales of produce has covered less than one third of its production costs.

<sup>6</sup> A *khutor* is a form of land tenure in which a peasant is granted lifelong use of a small holding on payment of an annual rent. See "Zemlya—krest'yanam" *Izvestia*, February 4, 1989, p. 2. There are said to be already more than 100 *khutory* in Estonia.

TABLE

BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION (BILLIONS OF CURRENT RUBLES)

EXPENDITURE	1982	1983	1986
Investments and other expenditure for expanding production	14.4	12.4	16.1
Operational expenditures	3.5	3.7	3.6
Subsidies to agricultural enterprises on purchases of industrial products	8.2	4.2	5.5
Subsidies on agricultural retail prices	29.9	54.6	58.1
Other expenditures	21.2	23.4	6.7
TOTAL	77.2	98.2	90.0
Total as percentage of total state budgetary expenditures	22.5	27.7	21.5
Total as percentage of amount paid for agricultural produce	84.0	85.3	70.0

SOURCES: Derived from V. N. Semenov, *Prodnovol'stvennaya programma i finansy*, Moscow, 1985, p. 113; "Tseny i finansy APK," *Finansy SSSR*, No. 9, 1988, pp. 21 and 23.

In the last three years, this burden has become even more onerous, primarily owing to increases in the supplements to procurement prices and rising prices for industrial products. It is reported that the annual subsidies for food production now total 103 billion rubles.<sup>7</sup>

There is also little hope that the problem of loss-making, inefficient kolkhozes will be solved for at least two years. The resolution includes a statement that all loss-making farms will undergo a two-year development program and will be disbanded only if they cannot show a profit by the end of that period. Finally, if all this was not enough of a strain on the government budget, the Party has pledged itself to an ambitious rural social development program that includes, among other things, providing every rural family with its own apartment or house, constructing adequate medical and educational facilities, and building good roads throughout the countryside.

<sup>7</sup> B. I. Gostev, "Gosudarstvennyi byudzhets SSSR na 1989 i zadachi po ego ispolneniyu," *Finansy SSSR*, No. 1, 1989, p. 7.

#### Ligachev-Style Program Rejected

A number of other measures given a good deal of attention at the plenum were promotion of scientific and technical progress; restructuring of investment in favor of the transportation and storage infrastructure and also of food processing facilities; development of fertilization, pesticide, land improvement, and ecology programs; and increasing farm machinery supplies. All the same, Gorbachev himself and the resolution seem to regard these measures as being of secondary importance. Significantly, these measures would have formed the mainstay of an agrarian policy developed by Egor Ligachev, Gorbachev's chief rival in the Politburo.

Over the past two months, Ligachev has delivered a number of speeches supporting a much more conservative agrarian policy based on old-style remedies rather than radical transformation of the countryside. The resolution specifically and pointedly rejects this approach:

The agrarian policy of previous years failed to produce the requisite results because its formulation and implementation took place without taking account of the need to improve production and economic relations and develop the peasant's personal interest in farming results. . . . Despite increasing investment in the agroindustrial complex and the consolidation of

its material and technical base, the breakthrough in the development of agriculture and the requisite improvement in the food supplies to the country's population were not forthcoming.

#### Conclusion

A general picture of Soviet agriculture over the next two to three years has emerged from the plenum on agrarian policy. The CPSU has gone far to facilitate politically the creation of radically new forms of land tenure. Devolution of important decision-making powers will most probably result in a wide spectrum of types of farming, ranging from traditional kolkhozes and sovkhozes operating largely on orders from above to quasi-privately owned and operated farms. As regards the commitment of new resources to the sector, while investment policy has been altered to target the most salient problems in the countryside (inadequacies in the social and production infrastructure), the Soviet habit of trying to solve agricultural problems with greater infusions of capital appears to have been broken. There seems to be little hope, however, that agriculture as a whole will become any less of a charge on the Soviet state in view of the continued restrictions on pricing, current production cost trends, and the refusal to liquidate loss-making farms in favor of more efficient management arrangements.

(RL 192/69, April 12, 1989)

## NUCLEAR ARMS

# Soviet Nuclear-Weapons Production\*

Douglas Clarke

Most of the headlines about President Mikhail Gorbachev's Guildhall speech in London on April 7 focused on his announcement that the USSR would stop producing weapons-grade uranium this year and would shut down two reactors manufacturing plutonium by next year. He also revealed for the first time that a plutonium-producing reactor was shut down in 1987. While momentarily enhancing Gorbachev's image as a man of peace, these announcements do not necessarily mean that there will be cuts in the Soviet Union's nuclear-weapons inventory.

\* This paper was first published as RAD Background Report/64, by *Radio Free Europe Research*, April 12, 1989.

#### Fissionable Materials

Uranium and plutonium are "fissionable" or "fissile" materials; their nuclei can be split to produce lighter atoms and energy. Both elements are capable of self-maintained fission in certain conditions; this is called a chain reaction. When the energy released with the splitting of each nucleus is combined with all the other fissions that take place in an atomic chain reaction, a few kilograms of fissile material can cause an awesome nuclear explosion equal to the force of thousands of tons of high explosives.

Uranium as it is usually found in nature will not sustain a chain reaction. It must be put through an expensive mechanical or chemical process to "enrich" it—that is, to increase the proportion of the

chemical variant, or isotope, of uranium that will support a chain reaction. This isotope is known as U-235, and it makes up less than 1 percent of naturally-occurring uranium. So-called weapons-grade uranium, sometimes known as highly enriched uranium, is more than 90 percent U-235.

Besides enriched uranium, the other most common fissile material is plutonium, which is produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiating the most common form of uranium, U-238. In making nuclear weapons, plutonium is more efficient than uranium, since an equal weight will produce a more powerful explosion. Most US nuclear weapons contain a combination of plutonium and enriched uranium.

#### USSR Twenty-Five Years behind USA

The United States stopped producing weapons-grade uranium in 1964, so Gorbachev's announcement that the Soviet Union will take the same step this year is hardly earthshaking. In short, it means that the Soviet Union, like the United States, has enough U-235 to suit its needs. The only surprise is that it took the USSR so long to reach this point.

The National Resources Defense Council, a private American environmental group that monitors nuclear-weapons production and inventories, estimates that there are some 500 metric tons of this material, also known as or alloy, either in, or reserved for, US nuclear warheads<sup>1</sup> and that the Soviet inventory is about the same size.<sup>2</sup> As it is virtually indestructible, the or alloy from older nuclear weapons can be recycled into new warheads. The or alloy and plutonium in the warheads associated with the more than 1,700 intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles being destroyed by the USSR over the next two years will provide a convenient reserve of weapons material.

#### Plutonium Production in USSR

As has been the case with many of his recent arms control pronouncements, Gorbachev disclosed some facts about the Soviet Union's plutonium production without revealing the whole picture. He said that one reactor that had produced weapons-grade plutonium had been shut down in 1987 and two more would be taken out of service by next year. He did not say how many plutonium-producing reactors would remain in service. In their book *Nuclear Battlefields*, William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse say that weapons-grade uranium and plutonium are produced at more than ten major

facilities in the USSR. They pinpoint Khyshym (just east of the Urals, near Chelyabinsk) as the site of a plutonium-manufacturing and reprocessing plant, and Troitsk (in the same region) as the location of a uranium-enrichment plant producing nuclear-weapons materials. The authors identify the Siberian towns of Beloyarsk and Dodonovo as reported sites of the other two primary facilities for plutonium production.<sup>3</sup>

In the late 1950s, a nuclear disaster on the scale of the Chernobyl accident took place at the Khyshym nuclear weapons complex. This event, which was probably caused by an explosion in the waste material left over from the plutonium production process, resulted in a 250-square-kilometer "dead zone" that remains abandoned to this day. According to a private Swedish company dealing in satellite images, however, a new nuclear facility has been constructed not far from the old complex. It is said to include at least one new military reactor built since 1977.<sup>4</sup>

Each of the facilities probably has several reactors producing plutonium. In recent months, US spokesmen have claimed that the USSR has twelve to fourteen such reactors currently in operation.<sup>5</sup> With an estimated plutonium inventory<sup>6</sup> of 115 metric tons, which is larger than the US stockpile,<sup>7</sup> the loss of two or three reactors would still leave the Soviet Union with an impressive nuclear-weapons production capability. The United States has shut down its five reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium for reasons of safety.

Some of the Soviet plutonium reactors are nearly as old as their American counterparts and are surely plagued with similar problems of safety and obsolescence. Gorbachev might well be making a virtue out of necessity by portraying the shutdown of these three reactors as a magnanimous arms control gesture.

"The US knows almost nothing about the particulars of Soviet nuclear warhead design, including details about how nuclear material is used,"<sup>8</sup>

<sup>3</sup> William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, *Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race*, Cambridge, Ballinger, 1985.

<sup>4</sup> AP, Reuters, UPI, November 30, 1988.

<sup>5</sup> R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Urged To Reconsider Arms-Production Stance," *The Washington Post*, April 8, 1989; and AP, April 9, 1989.

<sup>6</sup> Thomas B. Cochran and Robert S. Norris, quoted by AP, April 9, 1989.

<sup>7</sup> Cochran, Arkin, Norris, and Hoenig, *op. cit.* The US inventory of weapons-grade plutonium was estimated to be 93 metric tons in 1987.

<sup>8</sup> Richard L. Wagner, Jr., "A Case for Producing Nuclear Material," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January/February, 1988, p. 45.

admitted one former US official. Some information is available that might indicate that the USSR relies however, less heavily on plutonium than does the United States. In analyzing the yields of Soviet strategic weapons, two American scientists found that the Soviet warheads were significantly less efficient than US designs—that is, they produced a much smaller explosive yield for the same weight.<sup>9</sup> A greater use of U-235 could be one explanation for this.

#### American Tritium Problem

Although the forced shutdown of the US weapons reactors has not precipitated an immediate shortage of uranium or plutonium, it has drawn attention to another vital nuclear-weapons component that could soon be in short supply—tritium, an isotope of hydrogen that is used to "boost" the first stage of a thermonuclear, or hydrogen, weapon. Tritium has a half-life of only twelve years, which means that it decays at the rate of 5.5 percent per year. It is produced in a nuclear reactor, usually as a by product of plutonium production. Every few years, the tritium in a nuclear weapon using it must

<sup>9</sup> Lynn R. Sykes and Dan M. Davis, "The Yields of Soviet Strategic Weapons," *Scientific American*, January, 1987, p. 29.

be recharged. US officials have warned that they will soon be forced to take tritium from one bomb to recharge another unless tritium production is resumed.

Some arms control advocates see the so-called tritium factor as a convenient way to force nuclear disarmament. A pioneer US nuclear-weapons designer, Carson Mark, has estimated that the United States has enough tritium in warheads to sustain 6,000 warheads for more than twenty years.<sup>10</sup> He believes that the two superpowers would be forced to cut the number of warheads in their arsenals by about one half within twelve years if no more tritium were produced. Yet it is not at all clear that the burden of a shutdown in tritium production would fall evenly on the Soviet Union and the United States. Little is known about either the Soviet holdings of tritium or its use in Soviet warheads.

Modernizing the US nuclear-weapons production facilities will cost a great deal of money. In this era of tight budgets it is bound to generate a bitter debate. Gorbachev's disclosures in London might best be seen as a rather clumsy attempt to influence the debate.

<sup>10</sup> J. Carson Mark, "The Tritium Factor," *The Washington Post*, November 29, 1988.

(RL 193/89, April 12, 1989)

## DEFENSE INDUSTRY

# Economic Reform and the Defense Sector

Philip Hanson

A recent Soviet article claims that productivity is no higher in Soviet defense industries than in the civilian economy and that some Soviet defense plants face financial difficulties as the current "self-financing" reform is extended to the defense sector.<sup>1</sup> The author describes an experimental reform within the defense sector whereby a number of enterprises are being converted into special kinds of cooperatives, with no superior ministry controlling them. The experiment is more radical than any scheme so far introduced on a significant scale in civilian industry.

The author, A. Isaev, would appear, from the contents of the article, to be an official in the defense complex. That group of nine industrial ministries

<sup>1</sup> A. Isaev, "Reforma i oboronnye otrasli," *Kommunist*, No. 5, 1989, pp. 24-31.

accounts for a large part of the Soviet engineering industry and has been subject to special conditions of work unlike those in the rest of the economy. At the same time, many defense plants produce civilian as well as military items—especially consumer durables. They also buy inputs from civilian industry. The division between civilian and military industry is therefore not watertight. Until recently, information about the defense sector in the public domain has been sparse. One of the difficulties hampering Western attempts to assess the burden of defense production on the Soviet economy has been a lack of agreement about the relative efficiency of use of resources in the Soviet defense and civilian sectors.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> For an excellent review of this and related issues, see A. Becker, *Sitting on Bayonets: The Soviet Defense*

In his article, Isaev claims that output per worker, output per unit of capital, and efficiency of energy usage are about the same in defense and civilian industry. This, he argues, shows that the especially tight central control of defense production does not do much for its efficiency. He contends that the organizational features it shares with the civilian economy—lack of scope for decentralized decisions and lack of competitive pressures and incentives—have much the same debilitating effects as they do elsewhere in the economy. Therefore reform is as urgently needed in the defense sector as in the civilian economy.

Unfortunately but not surprisingly, Isaev produces no statistical evidence to back up his claim about the relative level of productivity in the defense sector. To do so would be to reveal more about defense production inputs and output than the authorities are yet ready to allow. Pending the provision of such evidence, however, there is a strong case for being skeptical about the assertion that the defense sector is no more efficient than the rest of the economy. It is subject to competition in the form of NATO military technology. That competition impinges on Soviet defense producers through the tough reliability and performance requirements enforced by a customer—the Soviet armed forces—whose sovereignty is far greater than that of any other domestic customer. If, as Isaev goes on to say, many Soviet military items are underpriced, productivity in the defense sector may well be underestimated when those prices are used to measure output and productivity.

The fact remains that the Soviet defense industries are the only large slice of the Soviet economy whose products are internationally competitive—both in the combat sense and in the purely commercial sense, where Soviet arms sold in the Third World are competitive with much of the Western equipment that is on offer. Perhaps that is achieved only by very large allocations of resources to defense production, in which case Isaev's contention about productivity may be correct. The trouble is that evidence on inputs and output is needed to judge this. There is, however, no obvious reason to doubt the sincerity of Isaev's expressed view, and it is what Soviet policymakers believe that affects policies.

What Isaev has to say about staffing, management, and finances in the defense sector is probably more reliable than his thesis about the level of productivity. He notes the power of the "monopoly-customer" (*monozakazchik*) to enforce quality controls and plan output in detail, but he also notes two weaknesses.

*Burden and the Slowdown of Soviet Defense Spending*, JRS-01, RAND Corporation, 1986.

First, there has been a strong tendency in recent years for qualified staff to leave the defense sector. Isaev attributes this to the greater pressure of work in the sector and to the fact that the greater restrictions (he probably means both the greater restrictions on publishing for scientists and the greater restrictions on travel and emigration) are no longer compensated for by sufficiently large differentials in pay and other rewards. Another reason for the outflow of staff, he says, has been the opportunities now available to work in independent cooperatives.

Second, any moves towards decentralization in the defense sector run into the problems: (a) that low product prices set by the monopoly customer remove the profit incentive and leave many defense producers financially weak if they have to fend for themselves and (b) that the highly concentrated, monopolistic structure of defense production is such that any attempt to switch to competitive tendering will be thwarted by a lack of competitors.

Isaev cites the example of the Saratov Aircraft Works. He says that civilian products account for 22 percent of its output and, as throughout the branch, the figure is rising. (Whether the branch here is aerospace only or the defense sector as a whole is unclear.) Some of its output is profitable, some not; it is in danger of bankruptcy, though, because one of its main product lines, the Yak-42 civil aircraft, has been upgraded at great cost but has a controlled price that, in Isaev's view, is only a third of what it should be (presumably on a long-term average-cost basis, with a standard rate of return on capital). Yet this aircraft, alone of Soviet civil aircraft, according to Isaev, has strong sales potential on the international market. The problem is that reform may reduce the incentive to produce more Yak-42s.

Isaev goes on to argue that what the defense sector needs is, first, the creation of many more medium and small enterprises so that competitive tendering can be effective and, second, a form of enterprise organization that would allow enterprises in the defense sector to negotiate its prices. That, he says, cannot be done by a state enterprise operating under the Law on the State Enterprise of 1987. To obtain this freedom, and the corresponding incentives to innovate and change the product-mix, many defense producers need, in his view, to go further and convert themselves into either cooperatives or self-managing enterprises leased from the state by their work collectives. He outlines an experimental scheme of cooperatives/labor-managed enterprises that is being introduced in an unspecified number of defense plants.

Isaev's general reasoning is in line with recent discussion in the Soviet Union that has moved from the issue of decentralizing the state sector to the need to develop new ownership forms. He emphasizes the need to stimulate technological change.

In general, he argues, there is scope for three different enterprises in Soviet industry. He calls them the budget enterprise, the collective enterprise, and the cooperative. His budget enterprise would be like the traditional state enterprise, but with all pretense of financial autonomy stripped away. He considers it appropriate for natural monopolies and lines of production in which there is little technological change. The examples he gives are electricity supply, the railroads, and (in the defense sector) munitions production. He points out that in many countries munitions production is carried out in state arsenals. The budget enterprise would be state-owned, with its work force paid wage rates set by the state, its output belonging to the state, and profits above cost put at the state's disposal.

The collective enterprise would be something closer to the Yugoslav worker-managed enterprise, although Isaev does not seem especially interested in worker management itself. What he has in mind is an enterprise whose work force (including management) either owns its capital assets or rents them from the state. In the case of the collective enterprise, the assets could simply be given to the work force by the state. Isaev envisages several variants, including co-ownership, with the state owning some shares in the enterprise. Ownership by the work force might be purely collective, with no individual shareholdings and hence no right to payment for shares when a worker leaves the collective. Or it might include individual shareholdings, in which case the enterprise would be (rather confusingly, for Isaev's tripartite classification of enterprises) a cooperative. In that case, he envisages that workers might have different shareholdings and be remunerated both according to their work and according to their contribution to the enterprise's capital. (He seems to be

sublimely uninterested in ideological objections to investment income.) A collective enterprise should have no superior administrative body controlling it. The state should influence the collective enterprise only by way of taxes, credit policies, the terms negotiated in a rental contract, or (an oddity out of line with existing legislation on labor collectives) through representatives of the state on the council of the work collective.

Isaev's third proposed type of enterprise would be the cooperative. It turns out that the only difference, in Isaev's terminology, between a cooperative and a collective enterprise with cooperative ownership would be in their origins: the cooperative would be a new enterprise formed from scratch on the initiative of a group of people; the collective enterprise would be formed from an existing state enterprise.

As an experiment, Isaev says, the defense sector is transferring 70 percent of the capital assets of a number of defense plants to their work forces, with the relevant ministry retaining the remaining 30 percent. The ministry can increase its share, subject to agreement, by channeling new investment into the enterprise from the state budget. The work force can presumably increase its share by investing its profits. There is to be no administrative superior (the fact that the ministry is only a minority shareholder is obviously meant to reinforce that rule). Restrictions on pay (and, apparently, on conditions of work) set by the Central Trade-Union Council and the State Committee for Labor, and the usual centrally set wage rates, do not apply.

Isaev gives no indication of the scale of the experiment or of when it started or will start. On the face of it, however, this is a remarkably bold experiment in an unlikely sector of the economy.

(RL 194/89, April 18, 1989)

## FOREIGN POLICY

# Authors of USSR's Afghan War Policy

Sergei Belitsky

The circumstances surrounding Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and the exposure of those who played a decisive role in the decision to intervene are among the questions currently exciting great attention in Soviet society. Even in the era of *glasnost*, the Soviet press has up to now kept silent on this issue. Although the current Soviet leadership is not directly responsible for the political decision taken a decade ago, it has evidently submitted to Party discipline and avoided

indicating either the authors of this decision or those who opposed it at the time. Witnesses who held key posts in the Party and the army have preferred not to broach this subject.

The first to break this silence was Boris El'tsin. At a pre-election meeting on March 11, 1989, responding to a voter wanting to know who made the decision to send troops to Afghanistan, he named four Politburo members—Leonid Brezhnev, Dmitrii Ustinov, Mikhail Suslov, and Andrei Gromyko.

A second similar account was given two days later by another candidate to the Congress of People's Deputies—Colonel General Dmitrii Volkogonov, who is now head of the Institute of Military History. In 1979, he was Deputy Chief of the Administration for Propaganda and Agitation of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy and held the rank of major general. In reply to the questions "How did we find ourselves in Afghanistan?" and "For what reasons?" he said:

The decision to send troops into Afghanistan was taken by a narrow circle of leaders. Were the military consulted? Ogarkov opposed; that cost him his career. Epishev, the head of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, and I were summoned to Ustinov. We spoke against. The reason for sending in the troops was a false appraisal of the political situation.<sup>1</sup>

Another account that also dates from about this time is provided by Army General Valentin Varennikov in an interview with *Ogonek* correspondent Genrikh Borovik.<sup>2</sup>

G. Borovik: We know that on the eve of the entry of our troops into Afghanistan, the General Staff was not in favor of such a decision being taken. We also know that its warning was not heeded by either the political leadership of that time or former Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov.

V. Varennikov: The General Staff did not support the idea of sending our troops into Afghanistan until it took the form of a decision. Nikolai Vasil'evich Ogarkov and Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeev were . . . against such a step.

Later Varennikov spoke about Ustinov's role:

I do not think that today all the blame should be placed on Dmitrii Fedorovich. He simply found himself in the wrong place in 1976.

The fact that these revelations have all come at much the same time suggests that the ban on admissions of this kind was suddenly lifted. The validity of each, however, has to be examined separately.

Without making light of the political authority of the four Politburo members named by El'tsin, it must nevertheless be said that they did not form a majority of this organ in 1979. El'tsin did not indicate the opinions of the remaining nine Politburo members, possibly because they included Vladimir Shcherbitsky—the only one still a member of the

Politburo today. In another interview, El'tsin also avoided mentioning Shcherbitsky when he was describing members of the current Politburo.<sup>3</sup> Shcherbitsky's role in the events of 1979 will possibly be explained more fully before he joins his former Politburo colleagues—Brezhnev, Ustinov, and Suslov—in the next world. For this to happen today, it might suffice for him to share the fate of Gromyko—retirement.

The part played by Aleksei Epishev in the origins of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan looks rather more complicated than Volkogonov makes it appear. In April, 1979, Epishev visited Afghanistan as head of a group of Soviet military specialists. In the opinion of Western experts, the aim of this visit was to make an evaluation of the political and military situation, which the Soviet leadership required in order to come to a decision about saving the unpopular regime. Only a week after Epishev's return to the USSR, a sharp increase in the supply of weapons of all kinds to Afghanistan was noted, and in December troops were sent into the country. It is possibly no coincidence that a similar visit made by Epishev to Czechoslovakia in 1968 also preceded a Soviet military intervention.<sup>4</sup> Even assuming that he was against the invasion of Afghanistan, this did not prevent him from keeping his position for a further period of more than six years, almost until the time of his death.

Volkogonov's inclusion of Nikolai Ogarkov among the opponents of the Afghan venture leads to a further question. In what manner did the Chief of the General Staff "pay with his career" for his opposition to the decision of the leadership in 1979 if he continued in the same position for the first five years of the Afghan war?

As far as Volkogonov himself is concerned, he made the most significant move of his career in the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy by becoming deputy chief during the course of the very war he claims to have opposed.

The declaration of Varennikov also seems suspect. Besides Ogarkov, he includes Ogarkov's successor as Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, among those who were against the war. Akhromeev, however, retained his post until the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was virtually completed.

Nevertheless, Varennikov did not dare class himself as an opponent of the military intervention in Afghanistan, since he headed a group in October, 1979, set up within the General Staff to handle preparations for the invasion.

<sup>3</sup> *Russkaya mysl'*, January 6, 1989.

<sup>4</sup> Mark Urban, *War in Afghanistan*, Macmillan, 1988, p. 31.

(RL 195/89, April 27, 1989)



## IN THE REPUBLICS

### UZBEKISTAN

# Demonstrations by Uzbek Popular Front

Timur Kocaoglu

On March 20, Reuters and AFP carried brief reports on a demonstration that had taken place on March 19 in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan. As the international news agencies' reports were based on one by UzTAG, the Uzbek Telegraph Agency, Radio Liberty's Uzbek Service tried to find out more about the demonstration by telephoning the official media in Tashkent on March 22. The deputy chief editor of the Uzbek Communist Party organ *Sovet Ozbekistani* told Radio Liberty that he did not have any additional information and suggested a telephone call to UzTAG. A Russian at UzTAG refused to let Radio Liberty speak to an Uzbek official or journalist there and, in turn, referred the caller to TASS.

The Uzbek Service of Radio Liberty told its listeners in Uzbekistan on March 22 of its failure to elicit information from the official media and appealed for further details about the demonstration. The response was swift: on March 25, a well-known Uzbek journalist, who wishes to remain anonymous, called Radio Liberty from Tashkent, and, a few hours later, a telephone interview was arranged in which he read the following report:

As is known, on Sunday, March 19, students, workers, and intellectuals calling for official recognition of Uzbek as the state language held a general demonstration on Lenin Square in the center of Tashkent. The official media of the republic have not yet given detailed information about this demonstration, which I will now proceed to do. First, let me say that, as UzTAG reported, the demonstration was not sanctioned by the authorities. Official permission had been sought twice over the past few months, but without success. For this reason, it was decided to hold the demonstration without permission. Although the event was not advertised in the public media, news of it was widely disseminated throughout Tashkent and the villages nearby.

Early morning, Lenin Square. All roads leading to the square were blocked by rows of policemen. At about ten in the morning, people started to gather on the roads. Their number reached 12,000 by noon. At that time, the people started to march towards the police picket-line. The demonstrators did not cause any trouble. They only clapped their hands. They were carrying portraits of Gorbachev and banners with the slogans "State Status for the Uzbek Language," "We Should Study the Old [Arabic] Alphabet," "Birlik [the Uzbek popular front] Should Be Recognized," "Long Live Gorbachev," "A Wide Road for Democracy," "Long Live Glasnost," "When Will There Be Restructuring in the Central Committee?" and so on. These kinds of slogans were numerous.

The police did not let the demonstrators onto the square. At one in the afternoon, Mirzaolim Ibrahimov, the new chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan, and Central Committee Secretary Mutal Halmuhammadov came out to calm the crowd by saying that the language question would be solved soon. Not satisfied with this response, the crowd demanded that the roads leading to Lenin Square be opened. The head of the republican government and the Party secretary were forced to obey, and they disappeared shortly afterwards.

The crowd entered the square, and the demonstration began. The writer Kenjabaev spoke of the need to give Uzbek the status of state language. The scholar Pulatov [who is chairman of "Birlik"] read the demands of the demonstrators. The poet Gulchehra Nurullaeva read a poem entitled "An Appeal." Neither this magnificent and great square nor Uzbekistan itself has ever witnessed such a large, spontaneous assembly.

On March 24, *Ozbekistan adabiyati va san'ati* wrote: "The demonstration was held in peace. It is possible to say that the ice of fear in the hearts of the people that was born in the black days of the past and rooted in the years of stagnation was melted."

I believe that this event will never fade from the memory of ordinary people or from the pages of our history.

Now, please listen to the poem "An Appeal" read by Gulchehra Nurullaeva at the demonstration:

Let my companions forget the Fatherland,  
Let them not recognize my being a poet,  
This world is, indeed, wondering and longing—  
Only let my mother tongue  
become the state language.

Let the evil eyes be plentiful,  
Let the property of the stingy ones increase,  
Let fate seek my murder—  
Only let my mother tongue  
become the state language.

Let my enemies' fame be doubled,  
Let my friends seek the company of my enemies,  
Let my table be bare—  
Only let my mother tongue  
become the state language.

The silence of a poet is dangerous,  
When someone is betraying his Fatherland,  
When it becomes worse than the fires of hell—  
Only let my mother tongue  
become the state language.

Let a dog bite me,  
Let my opponents applaud—  
The full heart cries: My mother tongue  
should be the language of the country.

On April 12, in a second interview with the same journalist, the Uzbek Service of Radio Liberty learned that the Uzbek popular front, "Birlik" (Unity), which had organized the demonstration on March 19, had staged a second one on April 9, at which its working group formally introduced "Birlik" to the public, appealed for official recognition, and asked that the organization be allowed to publish its own newspaper. The demonstration was sanctioned by the authorities but had to be held in Chuqursay Raion in the northern part of Tashkent, as the staging of demonstrations in the center of the city had been banned by the city Party committee in the wake of the events of March 19.

The journalist said that considerably more people—some estimates put the number at over 100,000—took part in the second demonstration than the 12,000 who had turned out for the one on March 19. The participants included leading intellectuals and writers as well as students, workers, farmers, and elderly people from various raions and oblasts throughout Uzbekistan. Some of those taking part were Kazakhs living in Uzbekistan. Radio Tashkent reported briefly on April 10 that the demonstration had taken place, but so far no account of it has appeared in the republican or central Soviet press.

The demonstration began at about noon and lasted for three hours. Portraits of both Lenin and Gorbachev were carried by the participants, as were slogans in three languages—Uzbek, Kazakh, and Russian. The slogans in Uzbek included the following: "Birlik Should Be Recognized," "There Is No Fortune outside the Fatherland," "He Who Departs from His Mother Tongue Will Depart from His People," and "The Nation Has No Need of Bureaucratic Leaders." The two slogans in Kazakh were "The Kazakhs in Uzbekistan Support the Recognition of Uzbek as the State Language in Uzbekistan" and "The State Language in Kazakhstan Should Be Kazakh." A Russian slogan read "There Won't Be a Central Asia without the Aral Sea."

According to the Uzbek journalist, most of the leading members of the popular front's working group, which was formed in November, 1988, and consists of twenty-five people, were present at the demonstration. They included the chairman, Abdurrahim Pulatov, who is a member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, and a deputy chairman, Ahmad A'zam, who is a literary critic. Pulatov read a report on the activities of "Birlik" during the past five months, stressing that the organization has gained considerable popularity in the republic and plays a significant role in pushing for the elimination of the cotton monoculture and for the promotion of Uzbek as the state language. He noted, however, that several Party leaders in the republic are trying to block "the rightful demands of the Uzbek people." When he asked the crowd whether they wholeheartedly supported "Birlik" and its program,<sup>1</sup> the people shouted with a single voice "We indeed support it!"

<sup>1</sup> The working group of "Birlik" reportedly mailed its draft program to the Uzbek Service of Radio Liberty on December 23, 1988, asking that it be broadcast, but that draft has not reached the West. The Uzbek Service did, however, manage to record the entire draft program in a third interview with the journalist in Tashkent and has produced a transcript of it.

Deputy Chairman A'zam demanded that "Birlik" be allowed to publish its own newspaper. He also declared that "Stalin has divided the single Turkic people in Central Asia." The writer Spandiyar, chairman of another unofficial group called "Uzbekistan," announced that several unofficial groups in the republic will soon join "Birlik."

After the presentation of several poems and songs by well-known poets and singers, a letter addressed to the demonstrators by the popular Uzbek poet Erkin Vahidov was read. In his letter, Vahidov expressed his support both for the official recognition of Uzbek as the state language and for "Birlik." The letter was optimistic in tone:

I believe that the cotton monoculture will be abolished in Uzbekistan; our gardens and plains that were destroyed will be rebuilt; our land will be freed of every kind of poison; clean water will be sent to all distant villages; our babies will not die any more; our women will not immolate themselves. For this we need not promises by ministers, but the solidarity of the people.

Vahidov declared that the man who owns his own land is "a free man" and a people that owns its own land is "a sovereign people."

Then an appeal by the outspoken Uzbek intellectual Muhammad Salih, a secretary of the Uzbek Writers' Union, was read. Salih cited the proverb "Every man reaps what he sows" and added that, so far, Uzbeks have not been reaping what they have sown. He also complained that some untruthful leaders have been trying to oppress the spirit of the Uzbek people by making unfounded charges of stealing, bribery, and corruption; he addressed those leaders directly:

Stop discriminating against the Uzbeks. This people has not been fighting for its rights. No one has yet said: "Either you learn my language or you leave Uzbekistan." Whom have we upset by saying: "You have eaten our bread, now you must pay for it?" Even today, under this deluge of accusations, the Uzbeks are saying nothing.

At the conclusion of the demonstration, the participants signed an appeal addressed to the government of Uzbekistan calling for official recognition of the popular front "Birlik" and for measures to improve both the material and spiritual lives of the population of the republic.

The demonstration was watched from a distance by members of the top leadership of the Uzbek Communist Party and Komsomol. Although the meeting was held in the northern part of Tashkent and was conducted peacefully from beginning to end, Lenin Square, in the city center, was encircled by police on April 9, and AP reported on April 14 that "an enormous number of troops" had been observed in Tashkent on the two days following the demonstration.

The gathering on April 9 was the second public appearance of the popular front "Birlik," which is pushing for official recognition as a legal organization in Uzbekistan. The large attendance at both demonstrations indicates that "Birlik" is attracting broad support not only among students and intellectuals but also among workers, farmers, and the general population. Furthermore, the presence of Kazakhs among the participants in the second meeting would seem to signal increased solidarity among the different Turkic peoples of Uzbekistan.

(RL 196/89, April 14, 1989)

## ELECTIONS

# A Victory for Reformers in Estonia and Latvia\*

Dzintra Bungis

Even before the results of the elections in the USSR on March 26 to choose deputies to the Congress of People's Deputies were complete, certain trends in Estonia and Latvia were

\* This paper was first published by *Radio Free Europe Research*.

readily apparent. In both republics the voter turnout was heavy by Western standards: 87.1 percent of the eligible voters in Estonia and 86.9 percent in Latvia cast ballots. This was not very high, however, when compared with past Soviet polls, some of which drew up to 99 percent of the electorate. It should be remembered, of course, that this was one

of the first times since Soviet rule was established in Estonia and Latvia that an election was reasonably democratic and participation voluntary.

In both republics the elections were a victory for the reformists and a clear endorsement of the policies of the respective popular front organizations, despite the fact that these organizations, in accordance with their status as civic associations rather than political parties, did not put forward candidates. The vast majority of the newly elected deputies are Party members, and most of them could be described as progressive. It is also evident that the more conservative, non-native voters in Estonia and Latvia cast their ballots for candidates affiliated with the Russian-dominated "Interdvizhenie" organizations, which draw their support in the two republics mostly from among factory managers and industrial workers who actively oppose the aims of the popular front organizations. It appears, then, that nationality and general political orientation (that is, liberal or conservative) were the principal factors in determining voting patterns.

#### A Preliminary Report on Estonia

In Estonia, the voters had to elect four deputies from territorial districts and thirty-two deputies from national-territorial districts. In the official list of candidates published in the principal republican newspapers on February 26, most of the electoral districts had at least two candidates to choose from, although there were three districts where only one candidate was running. In view of the fact that many candidates dropped out of the contest at the last moment, the number of candidates that actually competed for office is not yet known. It is, therefore, likely that the number of uncontested seats was greater than the earlier published list of candidates indicated.

Estonian Radio reported on March 27, the day after voting had taken place, that thirty of the republic's quota of thirty-six deputies had been elected. On March 28, the election reports appeared in the Estonian Communist Party newspapers *Rahva Haal* and *Sovetskaya Estoniya*. Detailed results were provided about the multicandidate contests in the four territorial districts, but less information was given about the outcome in the thirty-two national-territorial districts: the newspapers listed only the clear-cut winners (those who had obtained more than 50 percent of the ballots cast) in twenty-six districts and indicated that in five districts runoffs had to be held between the two top candidates and in one district (number 454, known as the Ocean district of Tallinn) a new election organized since neither of the candidates had the necessary majority. The results of the runoffs were published in the central republican

newspapers on April 11. Thus, by that time, Estonia had elected all but one of its deputies to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

Most of the elected deputies are reformists, and many of them are members of the Popular Front of Estonia or supporters of the policies of that organization. There were few surprises in the election results. Although the Popular Front of Estonia did not run its own candidates, it did eventually indicate its support for twenty-one candidates, fifteen of whom were elected on March 26 and another three on April 10. Altogether, seven candidates affiliated with the Russian-dominated "Interdvizhenie" were elected as deputies in those districts in which Russians comprise the majority of the population. It is interesting to note that the chairman of Estonia's KGB, Karl Kortelainen, was defeated in the Keila electoral district by Viktor Palm, the chairman of the Department of Organic Chemistry at Tartu University.

#### A Preliminary Report on Latvia

On March 26, the people of Latvia elected twenty-nine of the republic's forty deputies. Latvia is entitled to eight deputies from territorial districts and thirty-two deputies from national-territorial districts. According to the list of candidates published in the Latvian Communist Party newspaper *Cina* of February 25, only six of the ninety-six candidates ran unopposed. By March 26, two candidates had dropped out of the race, apparently from those districts where there were more than two candidates running. According to a Radio Riga report of March 27, runoffs had to be held during the next two weeks between the top two candidates in five electoral districts, and new elections will have to be held in six districts within two months of the election day. The last of the runoff elections took place in Riga on April 9. The new elections are scheduled for May 14.

About 80 percent of the newly elected deputies can be described as reformists and the rest as conservatives or political moderates. While a handful of the elected deputies may share the views of "Interdvizhenie"—a very conservative Russian-dominated organization that pays only lip service to Gorbachev's policies of *perestroika*, *glasnost'*, and democratization—only one or two of the organization's members have been elected in Latvia so far to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. It is possible, however, that a larger contingent in favor of "Interdvizhenie" may emerge from the new elections in the remaining six districts. At least half of the deputies are affiliated with the Popular Front of Latvia, which, like its Estonian counterpart, did not run its own candidates but endorsed candidates who supported the popular front's goals. It is still not known in the West precisely which

candidates received endorsement; more than a dozen popular front spokesmen, including its president Dainis Ivans, beat their opponents none-theless.

The contest that was most attentively followed in Latvia was in Riga's "Moscow electoral district" where two candidates from Latvia's National Independence Movement—Juris Dobelis and Einars Repse—were running against four members of the establishment: Janis Aboltins, deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee; Eriks Rozencveigs, an engineer at the Laukceltnieks enterprise; Andris Zarins, who is general director of the Latvian SSR Energy and Electricity Production Enterprise; and Janis Vagris, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party. In practice, the contest was between Vagris and Dobelis. Repse dropped out of the race a few days before the elections in order to secure more votes for Dobelis. As was expected, Vagris won, but he only just managed to poll 51.3 percent of the ballot. Dobelis received 34.2 percent, and the rest of the votes were spread among the other candidates. In Riga, where Latvians constitute only about one fourth of the population, this was quite a remarkable showing for Dobelis and the Independence Movement, which is considered to be more radical in its demands for reforms and Latvian national rights than the Popular Front of Latvia. Dobelis has subsequently been nominated in one of the election districts where new elections have to be held, a fact that attests to his popularity among Latvia's voters.

In the national territorial-electoral district of Cesis, Edvins Inkens, the senior editor of Latvian television news and information programs, and anchorman on the highly popular and controversial

biweekly show "Good Evening," won over Vilnis Edvins Bresis, chairman of the Council of Ministers. While both men are native Latvians and Party members, two factors favored the election of Inkens: he is a popular-front activist and a courageous advocate of reforms, while Bresis is considered to be a political moderate who prefers not to "rock the boat." Bresis has been given a second chance to become a deputy: he has been nominated as a candidate in one of the electoral districts where new elections are scheduled to take place on May 14. It remains to be seen whether he can overcome the initial defeat by winning in another electoral district.

#### Conclusion

The available election reports indicate that the reformists in Estonia and Latvia were able to elect most of their candidates as deputies to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Although the reform-minded citizenry in Estonia and Latvia did not organize themselves into formal political parties or lobbies, they were able to exert sufficient influence on the voters to secure the election of candidates who supported their views. What difference their election, and that of the reform-minded Lithuanian deputies, is going to make in Moscow in the all-Union parliament is difficult to say, but, looking at the numbers, their clout is not likely to be great since the new parliament will have 2,250 members and the Baltic contingent, in total, numbers only 118. Nevertheless, it is not only numbers that count in politics: determination and the ability to exert influence also play a role, and the Baltic deputies are likely to continue to spearhead reforms and innovations in the new Soviet parliament.

(RL 197/89, April 21, 1989)

#### CHERNOBYL'

## Growing Controversy over Effects of Radiation from Chernobyl' Disaster

David Marples

In February, *Moscow News* published an article by Vladimir Kolin'ko about medical and biological problems in the Narodichi Raion of Zhitomir Oblast in the Ukraine that are attributed to the Chernobyl' disaster of 1986.<sup>1</sup> That article has provoked a detailed and scornful response from Soviet

scientists published in a recent issue of *Pravda Ukrainy*.<sup>2</sup> The reply, which condemns Kolin'ko's article as "incompetent" and unfit for export outside the Soviet Union, was drawn up at the Center for Radiation Medicine of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR. The center, situated in Kiev,

<sup>1</sup> *Moscow News*, No. 8, 1989.

<sup>2</sup> *Pravda Ukrainy*, March 1, 1989.

has a number of functions, including study of the effects of low-level radiation and monitoring of the effects of the nuclear disaster on the health of the population. Shortly after the response appeared, however, further alarming details about the radioactive fallout were revealed in a number of sources.

Kolin'ko's article focused on birth defects among livestock, diseases of the thyroid gland caused by radioactive iodine, and the doubling of cancers of the mouth and lip in Narodichi Raion since the accident. The tone of the response from the scientists is set by a preamble in the form of a letter from Richard Wilson, a professor of physics at Harvard University, who asks: "Is this [account] simply a case of the Soviet press's being influenced by the American tendency towards sensationalism?" The scientists answer this question with a resounding "yes." Doctor of Physics and Mathematics I. Likhtarev, for example, declares that Kolin'ko's article would make the hair of non-specialists stand on end. He, however, could only shrug his shoulders with amused irony upon reading the *Moscow News* account. He immediately discounts theories that radioactive dust might have been carried great distances by the wind, arguing that a tornado or a sandstorm would have been required for this to happen.

Likhtarev's colleague A. Prisyazhnyuk, who is a doctor of medicine and head of the center's epidemiological laboratory, attempts to disprove the claim that the incidence of cancer of the mouth and lip has doubled since the accident. Because of the increased migration of the population after Chernobyl', he says, the number of patients in Narodichi Raion dropped dramatically to forty-nine—fewer than in 1985. In 1987, according to Prisyazhnyuk, ninety-four patients were registered (presumably, although it is not stated, because some of the population had returned home), but in 1988 the incidence of oncological diseases dropped to seventy-four. There were only three cases of cancer of the lip in 1987 and 1988, he states, whereas there had been seven in earlier years. Furthermore, he maintains, cancers of the mouth are to be attributed to gum diseases resulting from insufficient dental work.

B. G. Bebashko, a doctor of medicine and the director of the center's Institute of Clinical Radiology, provides statistics indicating that the birth and death rates of children in the raion have remained stable in the period 1985-88. He denies Kolin'ko's statement that thyroid cancers have developed in almost half the children in the raion, noting that 18 percent of the children have insignificant swellings of the thyroid gland. Likhtarev adds that neither specialists in radiology nor the republican health authorities have recommended that women in the raion should

not have children, though local doctors may have done so.

With regard to the question of birth defects among livestock, the scientists are even more scornful of the information provided by Kolin'ko. They report that the "Petrovsky" kolkhoz (discussed by Kolin'ko) was examined by a group of specialists following the appearance of the article in *Moscow News* and that only eight freak calves, rather than the sixty-two cited by Kolin'ko, were found. The anomalies that had occurred were said to be unrelated to radioactivity and to have resulted instead from a large increase in nitrates and a lack of microelements in the soil or from careless breeding of stock. The number of "freak" births was said to be remaining stable at around 2 percent, the same figure discovered on three farms in Poles'e Raion during a pre-Chernobyl' inspection in January, 1986.

Likhtarev concludes that the article in *Moscow News* is "unfit for export abroad" and that an apology should be provided. He also attacks the short film "Microphone!" (which was mentioned in an addendum to the article and reported to have been heavily censored by the USSR Ministry of Health) because its director, Georgii Shklyarevsky, interviewed nervous members of the population rather than experts from the government commission dealing with the consequences of Chernobyl'. Bebashko's view is that the article and film have reduced the population's trust in radiation specialists. In closing, Likhtarev asks rhetorically: "Can one achieve moral goals by immoral means?"

In analyzing the response of the scientists, it must be stated at the outset that Kolin'ko clearly did not produce a complete picture. In May, 1986, he was one of the first reporters (from the Novosti press agency) to provide a detailed account of the Chernobyl' disaster, but some of his figures were subsequently shown to be inaccurate or somewhat carelessly put together.<sup>3</sup> As the editorial board of *Pravda Ukrainy* points out, however, the problems were to be ascribed not so much to Kolin'ko as to the absence of *glasnost'* at the USSR Ministry of Health, which has maintained an attitude of great secretiveness as far as information about Chernobyl' is concerned.

Furthermore, the attempt of the scientists to play down the consequences of radiation in Narodichi Raion is undermined by more recent accounts from that area. At a press conference held in Kiev by the Ukrainian Ministry of Health shortly after the

<sup>3</sup> Kolin'ko noted, for example, that the entire population of Pripyat had been evacuated in "less than an hour" on the afternoon of Sunday, April 27. In fact, the process took between three and four hours, according to most reports. See *APV*, May 6, 1986.

article in *Pravda Ukrainy* was published, it was revealed that several areas in both Zhitomir and Kiev Oblasts have higher levels of contamination today, particularly Narodichi Raion (Zhitomir Oblast) and Poles'e Raion (Kiev Oblast).<sup>4</sup> Of the 260,000 people in these areas who were examined in the years 1987-88, 38 percent were declared to be in need of medical attention. The ministry's explanation for this very high figure was that many of the residents were elderly and had not undergone such a rigorous medical examination for some time. It is doubtful, however, whether health problems among almost 100,000 people can be ascribed simply to old age.

In response to what is described as a disturbing lack of attention to the problems caused by radioactive fallout from Chernobyl', the Information Section of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers has published the first detailed account of the consequences of the accident.<sup>5</sup> The article is notable for the provision of a map that divides the fallout area into four zones: a zone of "alienation" (I); a zone of temporary evacuation (II); a zone of constant control (III); and a zone of periodic control (IV). Zone I has been completely evacuated. Zone II is reported to contain 1,100 people who have returned to live in dangerously contaminated areas and refuse to be moved. Zones III and IV embrace a total of 176 settlements with some 84,000 people. Of these, about 47,000 are said to be in villages in which the contamination of the soil by cesium 137 exceeds fifteen curies per square kilometer and food has to be brought in from outside.

Zones III and IV encompass territories that were not hitherto known to be contaminated. Several villages in the northern part of Rovno Oblast, for example, are located in them, as is a section as far south as Ivankov (Kiev Oblast), very close to where the first evacuees were taken for safety after the disaster. Four Ukrainian oblasts have been seriously affected by radioactive fallout: Kiev, Zhitomir, Chernigov, and Rovno. Plainly, many residents have been completely unaware that they have been living in dangerous or potentially dangerous areas.

According to the article, private farms in the four fallout zones are safer than sovkhozes and kolkhozes, primarily because they are better manured and because the private sector has been

<sup>4</sup> *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, March 7, 1989.

<sup>5</sup> *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, March 1, 1989. There are many other aspects of the Chernobyl' disaster that appear to be addressed here for the first time. It is reported, for example, that, to assist in the examination of accident victims, 274 doctors were sent to Kiev Oblast last year and 352 to Zhitomir Oblast (it is not clear where they came from). This indicates, the authors state, that "the medical cadres" were strengthened. Might it not also

given a leaflet on "The Introduction of Special Private Farms on Contaminated Territories." Private plots have also received an increased amount of phosphorus and potassium, which is said to help prevent cesium from entering the food chain from the soil. Forests in the northern part of Ukraine, on the other hand, are now adorned with warning signs because they are severely contaminated, and new rules have been issued—"Temporary Recommendations for Forestry Operations." The upper reaches of the Kiev Reservoir are off-limits to fishermen, which was certainly not the case in the first year after the accident.

The level of contamination of food in parts of Zones III and IV appears to be alarmingly high. In 1988, for example, research into the quality of milk in the private farming sector revealed that in 30-50 percent of cases the permissible levels of contamination were exceeded. Also in excess of these limits were 30-50 percent of mushrooms, 10-12 percent of meat, and 20-30 percent of the fish caught in reservoirs and lakes.

Unfortunately, the health of those affected by radioactive fallout is not covered as comprehensively in the article, possibly because this information emanates from sectors of Soviet society that have been accused of excessive secrecy—the Center for Radiation Medicine and the USSR Ministry of Health. It is made clear, nonetheless, that 1986, in comparison with the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period (1981-85), showed a distinct rise in anemia and diseases of the respiratory organs and the stomach in the raions under investigation. In its entirety, the account substantiates the concern expressed in the article by Kolin'ko. Indeed, the extent of the fallout from Chernobyl' must now be declared to be much wider than previously believed.

Another Ukrainian newspaper, *Robitnycha hazeta*, recently published the first detailed discussion of the storage of high-, middle-, and low-level radioactive materials from the Chernobyl' accident site.<sup>6</sup> The article reveals that there are serious shortages of specialized transport for these materials; that not until 1991 will facilities come into operation that will attempt to deal definitively with the problem; and that, currently, high-level waste is being stored above ground in concrete containers with walls up to 2.5 meters thick. In short, there is much to be done here also.

Finally, to return to the response to the article published by Kolin'ko in *Moscow News*, the scientists made much of the fact that it has been seized upon by the Western media—i.e., that an irrespon-

indicate a growing concern over health problems in Zhitomir Oblast such as those in Narodichi Raion highlighted by Kolin'ko?

<sup>6</sup> *Robitnycha hazeta*, March 7, 1989.

sible Soviet reporter has caused the public in the West to take a renewed interest in the Chernobyl' fallout. Like Professor Wilson, they believe that this will lead to sensationalistic accounts.<sup>7</sup> What they neglect to mention, however, is that the popular Ukrainian youth newspaper *Molod' Ukrainy* also gave coverage to Kolin'ko's article, thereby ensuring that many Ukrainians, too, became aware of his

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, the accounts (which can hardly be described as sensationalistic) in *The Washington Post*, March 21, 1989, and *AP*, March 21, 1989.

## TATAR HISTORY

# Filling in the Blank Spots of Tatar Cultural History

Azade-Ayse Rorlich

Recent developments in the Tatar ASSR have added one more link to the chain of literary and cultural rehabilitations that have become increasingly frequent since 1986. In 1987, Lutsian Klimovich's articles published in *Zvezda Vostoka* and the Crimean Tatar journal *Yıldız* rehabilitated Ismail-bey Gaspirali (Gasprinsky), the founder of Jadidism, the movement of reform and renewal among Muslims of the Russian Empire.<sup>1</sup>

In 1987 and 1988, prominent Kazakh writers such as Abdijamil Nurpeisov and Oljas Suleimenov called for the rehabilitation of Shakerim Qudayberdiev, Maghjan Jumabaev, and other "forgotten" writers, while Uzbek writers and intellectuals strove to achieve a more thorough rehabilitation of Abdullah Qadiri, Fitrat (Abdurauf Abdurahimoghli), and Cholpan (Abdulhamid Sulayman-oghli Yunusov).<sup>2</sup> And in Tatarstan, at the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989, long-held taboos were lifted and scholars continued to fill in the blank spots of

<sup>1</sup> L. Klimovich, "Na sluzhbe prosveshcheniya," *Zvezda Vostoka*, No. 8, 1987, pp. 173-9, and "Maarif hizmetinde," *Yıldız*, No. 6, 1987, pp. 75-86. See also Ann Sheehy, *RL 69/88*, "Rehabilitation of Ismail-bey Gaspirali, the 'Father' of Jadidism," February 12, 1988.

<sup>2</sup> See *Literaturnaya gazeta*, February 24, 1988; *Yash Leninchi*, February 4, 1988; and *Ozbekistan Adabiyati va Sanati*, May 13, 1988. See also: John Soper, *RL 165/88*, "Reassessment of Once-Banned Uzbek Writ-

statements.<sup>8</sup> As with many recent events in the Soviet nuclear industry, the key factor may not necessarily be what is the true story, but rather what the people choose to believe. Like the Soviet health authorities, the Center for Radiation Medicine has also been virtually silent about the Chernobyl' fallout for the past three years. Kolin'ko's account has at least prompted scientists at the center—belatedly—to provide some information.

<sup>8</sup> *Molod' Ukrainy*, February 26, 1989.

(*RL 198/89*, April 8, 1989)

Tatar history by adding the names of Ayaz Ishaki, Hamid Zobaer-Koshay, Rashit Rahmati-Arat, and Ak'das Nimat-Kurat to the cultural patrimony of the Tatars.

The issue of *Vechernyaya Kazan'* for October 17, 1988, featured an article by the well-known literary scholar Ibrahim Nurullin entitled "Vozvrashchenie Gayaza Ishaki" (The Return of Ayaz Ishaki), which amounted to a rehabilitation of one of the leading literary and political figures of twentieth-century Tatar history.

Born on February 23, 1878, into the family of a mullah from the village of Yavshirma in the *guberniya* of Kazan', Ishaki received a traditional education at the *medresse* of Chistopol' and Kazan' (1890-93) and a secular education at the Kazan' Teachers' School, from which he graduated in 1898. As a student, Ishaki participated in the radical activities of the organization Al-Islah, thus taking the first step towards a lifelong commitment to politics. This commitment acquired a clearer profile in 1905 when Ishaki emerged as the leader of the radical left wing of the Tatar national movement, which shared a political kinship with the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries and came to be known as Tangchilar. As leader of the Tangchilar,

ers Continues," March 31, 1988; and Bess Brown, "Nationalist Literary Figures Rehabilitated in Kazakhstan," *Report on the USSR*, No. 6, 1989, p. 1.

Ishaki opposed the liberalism of the "Ittifak" (a Muslim political caucus of Kadet orientation) at the first Congress of the Muslims of Russia held in Nizhni-Novgorod in 1906. Ishaki's radicalism attracted the attention of the Tsarist authorities, whose retaliation took the form of prison and exile terms, which Ishaki spent in the Arkhangelsk and Vologda provinces in 1906-07 and 1909-13.

The fall of the Romanov dynasty renewed Ishaki's hope for national and cultural autonomy, and to further this goal he played a major role in the organization of the two Congresses of the Muslims of Russia held in May and July, 1917, in Moscow and Kazan', respectively. Bolshevik victory in October, 1917, and the fortunes of the Civil War shattered Ishaki's dreams of national autonomy, and he took the grievances of his people to the European Peace Conference, traveling there via the Far East and Japan. The consolidation of the Soviet regime led to his decision to remain abroad. He was politically active throughout his life in emigration (in France, Germany, Poland, and Turkey) and remained committed to the ideal of national and cultural autonomy for his homeland until his death on July 22, 1954, in Ankara.

Ishaki's life was not confined to political activism. He was also a gifted journalist whose evolution from a commitment to Socialist ideals to a defense of national ideals unfolded in articles published in the newspapers *Il* (The Country) and *Suz* (The Word), which he founded in the years before 1917. In exile, he published the monthly *Milli Yul* (The National Path) between 1928 and 1930, when he changed its name to *Yanga Milli Yul* (The New National Path). This newspaper continued publication until 1939. In 1935, Ishaki founded the weekly newspaper *Milli Bayrak* (The National Flag), which appeared until mid 1945.

Ishaki was also a talented Jadid writer, whose rich literary legacy includes close to fifty short stories, as well as novels, plays, novellas, translations, memoirs, and historical essays echoing the ideals of enlightenment, justice, and economic and political progress that have since become so intimately associated with the Jadid movement as a whole.<sup>3</sup> It is this legacy in particular that serves as Nurullin's argument for "the return of Ayaz Ishaki" after being absent for almost six decades from the pages of literary scholarship and belles lettres. In his 1923 study of Tatar culture, J. Validov acknowledged the important role played by Ishaki in the history of twentieth-century Tatar literature. A. Saadi in his *History of Tatar Literature* of 1926 placed Ishaki among the important writers of early

<sup>3</sup> For information on Ishaki's life, see the commemorative volume *Muhammed Ayaz Ishaki. Hayati ve Faaliyeti. 100 Dogum Yili Dolayisiyla*, Ankara, 1979.

twentieth-century Tatar literature.<sup>4</sup> These were, however, the last recognitions of Ishaki in Soviet literary scholarship; both belonged to the period of relative artistic and literary freedom that characterized the early 1920s in the Soviet Union.

After 1926, Ishaki's name appeared in the works of Soviet historians or literary scholars only to be vilified as a nationalist or enemy of the Soviet people. The list of such works, whether monographs or journal articles, is too long to be mentioned in full here, but typical examples are the monographs of K. Faseev, K. Mukhariamov, and M. Saidashova, and an article by K. Fasakhov and M. Molekov.<sup>5</sup>

Ten years after the Twentieth Party Congress, two important monographs on Tatar literature were published in Kazan', both of them dedicated to Tatar literature at the beginning of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, neither of the authors went beyond perpetuating the labels of "counterrevolutionary émigré" and "bourgeois nationalist" that had become the standard epithets assigned to Ishaki since 1926. Ironically, one of the authors was the same Nurullin who guided "the return of Ayaz Ishaki" in *Vechernyaya Kazan'* in October, 1988.<sup>6</sup>

Nurullin's article mentions Ishaki's contributions as a journalist, writer, and novelist and also provides information on his political activities. Thus, the readers of *Vechernyaya Kazan'* learn that he was a Tatar Socialist Revolutionary who stood firmly against autocracy as well as bourgeois liberalism and strove to educate the peasant masses in these ideals. As for Ishaki's political destiny after October, 1917, Nurullin's explanation is benign in its brevity:

He did not accept October and Soviet power, since, like all SRs and Mensheviks, he considered that backward Russia (its national borders in particular) was not yet ripe for a Socialist revolution.

<sup>4</sup> J. Validov, *Ocherk istorii obrazovannosti i literatury Tatar*, Moscow and Petrograd, 1923, p. 84-5; and A. Saadi, *Moscow adabiyati tarhi*, Kazan', 1926, pp. 133-5.

<sup>5</sup> K. Faseev, *Na putyakh proletarskogo internatsionalizma*, Kazan', 1971, p. 250; K. Mukhariamov, *Oktyabr' i gosudarstvennoe stroitel'stvo v Tatarii*, Moscow, 1969, p. 27; M. Saidashova, *Lenin i sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo v Tatarii*, Moscow, 1969, p. 240; and K. Faesaekhov and M. Molekov, "Chinbarlik ham ani bozip Kursatuchelar," *Kazan Utlari*, No. 4, 1976, pp. 169-76.

<sup>6</sup> M. Gainullin, *Tatarskaya literatura i publitsistika nachala xx veka*, Kazan', 1966, and I. Nurullin, *XX yoz bashi Tatar adabiyati*, Kazan', 1966.

Nurullin does not evaluate Ishaki's life in emigration but argues that, despite the paucity of information on this subject, some accusations can be dismissed without adducing further evidence: "It is more than doubtful, for instance, that after the war the writer, in his seventies, went to Turkey as an agent of American intelligence."

Ishaki did not, as Nurullin contends, die in poverty or alone, but he did die without accepting the political reality of his homeland, as Nurullin correctly points out. One of the most interesting statements Nurullin makes in his article in effect rules out the possibility that Ishaki's émigré activities had a negative impact on Tatar history by arguing that they are irrelevant:

In view of the need for a new, genuinely scholarly treatment of the history and literature of the Tatar people, his activities abroad do not have a special relevance [for this issue].

Throughout the article Nurullin emphasizes Ishaki's literary contributions, his interest in Russian literature, his literary ties with Maxim Gorky and evaluations of his works by V. Gordlevsky and N. Ashmarin. This is in a way justified by the fact that Nurullin's article introduces to the reader the story *Shakird-abiy* (The Student Brother), published in the same issue of *Vechernyaya Kazan'* seventy-five years after its publication in Russian translation on the pages of the journal *Sovremennik*. Having "returned Ayaz Ishaki" to the readers of his homeland, Nurullin also engages in "a revision" of his own monograph of 1966. He concludes:

Under any circumstances, without the works of its founder, the beginning of the twentieth century in the history of Tatar literature will remind [one] of a book with a missing first chapter.

The well-known Tatar historian A. Khalikov made an important contribution to the current effort to integrate the émigré legacy into the cultural patrimony of the Tatars in an article published in *Sotsialistik Tatarstan* on January 15, 1989.<sup>7</sup> The introductory note to the vignettes of Tatar scholars Hamid Zoebaer-Koshay, Rashid Rakhmeti-Arat, and Ak'des Nimat-Kurat, whom Khalikov introduces to his readers, contains several interesting statements. The first one concerns the issue of emigration itself and lifts the stigma of treason from those associated with it, simply recording that after October, 1917, some Tatars "went abroad for various reasons and chose to remain there." The second concerns the conspiracy of silence around Tatars

<sup>7</sup> A. Khalikov, "Galim yaktashlar," *Sotsialistik Tatarstan*, January 15, 1989.

living in emigration, even of those who are scholars of international standing. "We have long known about them," notes Khalikov, "but for well-known reasons, we could not mention such compatriots in the press."

As he states, Khalikov's main goals in writing the article are to introduce the emigre scholars to the people of Tatarstan and "to return to science" their scholarly contributions. To this end, he introduces the first three émigré scholars.

Hamid Zoebaer-Koshay, a native of the village of Telanche Tamak, was born in 1897. He left Russia in 1909 when his family moved to Turkey, but maintained an interest in the culture of his homeland through his scholarship. He became one of the leading anthropologists, ethnographers, and folklorists of this century. Khalikov notes that, as well as being a curator of the Topkapi Museum in Istanbul, a member of UNESCO's Museum Commission, and one of the editors of the World Folklore Atlas, Koshay, until his death in 1978, also devoted time to the early history of the Tatars and Bashkirs.

Rashid Rakhmeti Arat (1900-64) spent the first twenty years of his life in Russia, witnessing some of the most crucial changes in the life of his homeland. His departure in 1920 took Arat first to Harbin and then to Germany and Turkey, where he distinguished himself in the fields of Turcology and history. It is interesting that, in listing Arat's contributions, Khalikov chooses to comment on his thesis regarding the ethnogenesis of the Mishars and Kazan' Tatars. Arat regarded both groups as the heirs of the Golden Horde, while not ignoring the contributions of the Bulghar state and culture in the emergence of the Kazan' Tatars. Such information should be of great interest to Tatar readers today, especially in view of recent debates and their renewed interest in ethnicity and language.

Ak'des Nimat-Kurat (1904-71) is the third scholar Khalikov introduces to his readers. He too left Soviet Russia soon after the revolution (1921), and, after traveling to Riga and Berlin (where he earned a doctoral degree), settled in Turkey in 1928. Khalikov mentions with great respect Kurat's scholarly contributions to the medieval history of the Turkic peoples, particularly his publication of Golden Horde, Crimean, and Ottoman documents relevant to the history of the Middle Volga. Khalikov concludes his article by noting that Kurat not only knew well the history and literature of Soviet Tatarstan, but that his evaluation of both was scholarly and objective. Such a conclusion, in fact, highlights the urgency of the task of integrating into Tatar scholarship and culture the contributions of leading émigré intellectuals who are being recognized today as legitimate branches of the same national tree.

(RL 199/89, April 8, 1989)

## ELECTIONS

# Preliminary Results of Runoff Elections in Lithuania\*

Saulius Girnius

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On April 9, runoff elections for the USSR Congress of People's Deputies were held in sixty-four districts, eight of them in Lithuania. The elections were held in districts where there were more than two candidates in the elections on March 26, none of whom received a majority of the votes cast. The two candidates who won the most votes then ran against each other, and the candidate who received most votes, even if not a majority, was elected. Before the official results had been announced, the Lithuanian Restructuring Movement (*Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sąjūdis*, commonly known as Sajudis) said that its candidates had won five of the eight races. This is a strong showing but not as impressive as the sweep on March 26 when Sajudis won thirty-one of the thirty-nine districts in which it had candidates. In an effort to restore its credibility as the party of the people, the Lithuanian Communist Party ran a very vigorous campaign in the three electoral districts where high-ranking Party officials were running; two of these officials won election.

It appears that a smaller share of the eligible voters participated in the runoff elections than in the first round on March 26. There were, moreover, accusations of electoral fraud in the three districts where Sajudis candidates lost. Angonita Rupšytė, a member of the Sajudis electoral commission, told RFE/RL that officials in some precincts had refused to allow even members of the electoral commissions to monitor the voting and that some of the ballot boxes had been handed in unsealed. Some people were alleged to have cast votes on behalf of family members, and some people who claimed not to have voted were nevertheless listed as having done so. Sajudis is considering filing a formal complaint.

### The Lithuanian Communist Party

In the elections on March 26, high Party and government officials, except for the first and second secretaries of the Lithuanian Communist Party who ran unopposed by Sajudis candidates, were soundly defeated. Sajudis candidates won victories over Chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Minis-

ters Vytautas Sakalauskas, Chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Vytautas Astrauskas, and Central Committee Secretaries Stanislovas Giedraitis and Bronislovas Zaikauskas, as well as other ministers and city and raion first secretaries.

In order to avoid further embarrassment, the Party pulled out all stops in its efforts to ensure victory for the three high Party candidates who reached the second round—Kestutis Zaleckas, the first secretary of the Vilnius City Party Committee; Genadii Konoplev, the deputy chairman of the State Agroindustrial Committee; and Alfonsas Macaitis, the first secretary of the Lithuanian Komsomol. Macaitis lost the election to Gunaras Imantas Kakaras, a senior scientist at the Physics Institute of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences. Zaleckas defeated the Sajudis candidate Vidmantas Žiemelis; and Konoplev defeated Česlovas Kudaba, a Vilnius University professor who is the chairman of the Lithuanian Cultural Foundation. The victory of Konoplev, a Russian, appears to have been influenced by the greater share of non-Lithuanians in the district, which consisted of the raions of Ignalina and Svenčioniai where Lithuanians made up only 64.3 percent and 47.8 percent of the inhabitants respectively in 1979.

### The Nationality Question

Non-Lithuanians, in particular Russians and Poles, have viewed the growing expression of Lithuanian national awareness with dismay and have been angered by the decision to make Lithuanian the official language of the republic. Many non-Lithuanians have joined together in the "Edinstvo" (Unity) organization, which has organized mass rallies and work stoppages to express its dissatisfaction with the situation. No "Edinstvo" candidate was elected on March 26, and only one, Ivan Tikhonovich (Jan Ciechanowicz is apparently his original Polish name), an instructor at the Philosophy Department of Vilnius State Pedagogical Institute, reached the runoff elections. Tikhonovich defeated the Sajudis candidate, Virgilijus Čepaitis, in the runoff election in the Vilnius Spalio national-territorial district. It would appear that nationality was a major factor there, for many voters are said to have asked which candidate was a Lithuanian so

\* This paper was first published by *Radio Free Europe Research*.

that they could cross his name out on the ballot. It was not clear whether the people who voted for Tikhonovich were ardent supporters of "Edinstvo," but they were clearly against Lithuanian candidates.

#### Conclusions

While Sajudis did not do as well in the runoff elections, it has nevertheless won thirty-six of the forty-one seats to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and has emerged as the major spokesman for Lithuania. It is clear that the Sajudis candidates, even in a bloc with the deputies supported by

the popular fronts in Estonia and Latvia, will comprise only a small share of the members of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and are unlikely to play a major role there. The victories have, however, enhanced the standing of the Sajudis deputies—indeed, last week four of them held cordial talks in Moscow with Anatolii Luk'yanov, the first deputy chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The elections were, moreover, a test run for the elections in the fall to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, which should determine the course of reform in Lithuania.

(RL 200/89, April 21, 1989)

# The USSR This Week

Vera Tolz

Saturday, April 15

#### Situation in Georgia

On April 15, a report from Tbilisi said more funerals were held that day of victims of the clashes on April 9 between troops and demonstrators (*Radio Moscow, Reuters, April 15*). The same day, a group of Moscow intellectuals, including Andrei Sakharov, blamed the clashes on decrees adopted in July, 1988, to control demonstrations. The decrees gave broad rights to special MVD troops in dealing with protesters (*AP, April 15*). Speaking on Soviet television from Tbilisi, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze promised that the night curfew would be lifted soon and troops withdrawn from the Georgian capital. Shevardnadze said the situation was gradually stabilizing in Georgia.

On April 16, a mass demonstration took place in Moscow to demand that those responsible for the deaths of demonstrators in Tbilisi be punished. Sakharov addressed the gathering (*Reuters, AFP, April 16*). The same day, the authorities in Tbilisi shortened the curfew by two hours and began pulling troops out of the city (*UPI, April 16*). On April 16, *Pravda* published the text of a speech delivered by Shevardnadze in Tbilisi on April 14. The newspaper quoted Shevardnadze as saying the decision to deploy the troops in Tbilisi was taken by the republican Party leadership, who chose "to talk to the people from behind tanks." (Soviet activists questioned Shevardnadze's assertion, pointing out that it would be unusual for republican leaders to take a decision to deploy troops without checking with Moscow.) On April 16, Georgia's new Party leader, Givi Gumbaridze, said in an interview with Soviet television that his aim was to restore a normal rhythm of life to the republic as soon as possible.

On April 17, students in Tbilisi ended protest boycotts and went back to their classes (*AP, Reuters, April 17*). The same day, the curfew in Tbilisi was lifted. Radio Moscow said that "part of the military force" sent to Tbilisi to restore order had been withdrawn. The same day, Soviet television broadcast another interview with Shevardnadze, who said the situation in Georgia had returned to normal. Shevardnadze said that leaders in the USSR had not yet mastered the art of dialogue with their own people. Shevardnadze was accompanied on his trip by candidate Politburo member Georgii Razumovsky, who was also interviewed on television.

On April 18, *AP* quoted Lea Umanishvili, chief editor of Georgian television, as saying the Georgian authorities were still searching for fourteen people listed as missing since the

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April 9 clashes. The same day, Shevardnadze and Razumovsky left Tbilisi for Moscow (TASS, April 18; *Pravda*, April 19). TASS also reported that all troops had been withdrawn from Tbilisi.

On April 19, six deputies to the new Congress of People's Deputies were quoted as saying the violent dispersal by riot squads of the demonstration in Tbilisi on April 9 showed how reform could be cut short in the USSR. They charged that the authorities had imposed fierce censorship on reports from the Georgian capital and issued a blatantly distorted official account. The deputies insisted that poison gas had been used against the demonstrators in Tbilisi. They said that the remark on the use of shovels and poison gas was cut out of an interview conducted by Soviet television with Georgian Health Minister Irakly Menagharishvili. Reuters said the statement of the deputies is to appear in *Moscow News* (No. 17). The behavior of troops on April 9 in Tbilisi was also criticized at a meeting in the USSR Academy of Sciences (AP, April 19). The same day, *Pravda* commented on the use of chemicals in the April 9 clashes. It said that officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs claimed that tear gas (not poison gas) had been used. Soviet television interviewed Georgian Party leader Givi Gumbaridze. He said it was wrong to think that the crisis was over in Georgia. He also said it would be a mistake to prevent journalists from providing detailed information on the situation in Georgia. In an interview with French television, Sakharov said that recent violence in Georgia against demonstrators had shown that "perestroika is in danger" (AFP, April 20).

On April 20, unofficial reports from Tbilisi said that thirty-six people had died as a result of the clashes on April 9 (RFE/RL *Special*, April 20). Official Soviet reports continued to say that twenty people had been killed and fourteen people were still missing. A Foreign Ministry spokesman, Yuri Gremitsky, also denied that poison (nerve) gas had been used against demonstrators in Tbilisi and said the substance used was a form of tear gas (UPI, AP, April 20). The same day, however, *Izvestia* gave a conflicting report. It said the Georgian Health Ministry had confirmed that some people were "poisoned by an unknown chemical substance" during the clashes.

On April 21, a meeting took place at the Cinema Workers' Union in Moscow to discuss the situation in Georgia. Georgian filmmaker Eldar Shengelaya, who has been elected to the Congress of People's Deputies, told the meeting that the Soviet authorities had attempted a massive cover-up after troops killed at least twenty demonstrators in Tbilisi. The meeting was shown a clandestine video film that contradicted official accounts that troops in Tbilisi had used maximum restraint and only responded when they came under attack. The film showed clearly that the troops attacked without provocation. Shengelaya told the meeting that the local authorities in Georgia would not have had sufficient authority to call in the troops without the go-ahead from Moscow (Reuters, April 21). The same day, Reuters reported that the latest issue of the weekly *Nedelya* carried a lengthy commentary on the situation in Georgia. The newspaper complained that the troops had used some

sharpened instruments (apparently shovels) against demonstrators. "Expert medical examinations have already proved that many of them [killed in the April 9 clash] died from wounds caused by sharp as well as blunt instruments," Vladlen Arsen'ev wrote in the weekly. Soviet television and TASS reported the same day that, at its weekly meeting on April 20, the Politburo discussed the situation in Georgia. The media said USSR Public Prosecutor Aleksandr Sukharev told the Politburo that his office would control the criminal investigation into the clashes on April 9.

#### **Congress of People's Deputies to Meet on May 25**

The Congress of People's Deputies will meet on May 25, in accordance with a decree passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and made public today. Of the seventy-six deputies elected in the runoff elections, which ended on April 9, 85.5 percent are CPSU members, 90.8 percent are men, and 19.7 percent are industrial or agricultural workers. There were 150 candidates competing for the seventy-six seats; voter turnout was 74.5 percent (*Radio Moscow-1*, April 14; TASS, April 15).

#### **Petrovsky on Conditions for Journalists**

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky said the Soviet Union had made good progress in improving working conditions for foreign journalists but much remained to be done. In remarks carried by TASS, Petrovsky said foreign journalists in the USSR now have access to many Soviet institutions, travel restrictions for journalists have been eased, and there are official press briefings almost daily. He added, however, that there should be better distribution and sales of foreign periodicals in the USSR and better reception of foreign television broadcasts. Petrovsky's remarks preceded the opening in London on April 18 of an international information forum involving signatory states of the Helsinki accords (TASS, April 15). On April 19, Petrovsky told the forum that work was under way to ensure that Soviet citizens have free access to information, including subscriptions to foreign periodicals and reception of foreign television broadcasts (Reuters, RFE/RL *Special*, April 19). On April 21, *Pravda* carried an article saying the USSR was trying to create "the best possible conditions" for foreign reporters.

#### **Printing Machine Meant for Christian Publisher Impounded**

A printing machine taken to the USSR as a gift for a publisher of Christian literature was reported to have been impounded by Soviet customs agents. A British clergyman, Reverend Dick Rodgers, had flown from London to Moscow with the machine to deliver it to Aleksandr Ogorodnikov. Ogorodnikov publishes the *Bulletin of the Christian Community*. Rodgers' wife said the Soviet customs agents had told Rodgers he did not have the proper documents (AP, April 15).

#### **Agricultural Association Set Up in Latvia**

Latvian farmers have set up an agricultural association to help improve the republic's food supply. TASS said the association's constituent congress began work in Riga today. The association already has 146,000 members. TASS said

the association's program aims to increase agricultural output by using updated economic methods and various forms of farming—ranging from individual farms to the already existing state and collective farms. TASS said the situation in agriculture in the republic is extremely unfavorable. It said that, while Latvia used to be famous for its high-quality bacon and fats on world markets, now it is unable to feed its own population. The agency also said one million hectares of arable land had been lost because of excessive industrial development (TASS, April 15).

**Britain's Prince Edward  
Visits Moscow**

Britain's Prince Edward arrived in Moscow on a three-day visit. He was welcomed at the airport by USSR Deputy Minister of Culture Yurii Khilchevsky. The visit is linked to the staging in Moscow of T. S. Eliot's play *Murder in the Cathedral* by Britain's National Youth Theater, of which Prince Edward is a patron (UPI, AP, April 15).

**USSR Gives Up Phobos-2  
Mars Probe**

Soviet space agency officials have decided to abandon the Phobos-2 Mars probe, with which contact was lost last month. A Soviet space official, Roal'd Kremnev, told a press conference near Moscow that no further attempts would be made to reestablish contact with the unmanned probe, which has been circling Mars for the past two months. He said it is not yet clear why the link was lost. Last September, the USSR lost contact with the Phobos-1 Mars probe due to an incorrect computer command sent by a ground controller (TASS, April 15).

**USSR Protests against  
Expulsion of Trade  
Representative from US**

The Soviet Union protested against the expulsion of a Soviet trade representative from the United States last month. TASS said US ambassador Jack Matlock was told on April 14 that the United States "would bear full responsibility for possible consequences and that the incident remained open." The United States expelled the Soviet trade representative in retaliation for the expulsion of a US military attaché from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union expelled the attaché after the United States expelled a Soviet military attaché.

Sunday, April 16

**Increased Imports of  
Consumer Goods**

Reuters reported that USSR Deputy Minister of Trade Sarukhanov had announced an increase in the planned level of consumer goods imports for this year. Such imports were originally planned at 32 billion rubles but they will now total 37 billion rubles. The increase was decided on in December. The statement refers to consumer goods imported from all trade partners, East and West. Often such statements refer only to nonfood, manufactured consumer goods, but it is not clear in the present case what types of goods will be imported. Nor does the report make clear whether the ruble values are in domestic retail prices or in current *valyuta* (foreign-trade) rubles.

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**Khrushchev Hailed in Moscow as  
Godfather of Gorbachev Reform**

Nikita Khrushchev was hailed at a mass meeting in Moscow as the man who sowed the seeds for Gorbachev's restructuring drive. "None of us in [Stalin's] labor camps believed that out of the gang around Stalin there would emerge one who would storm the evil citadel of Stalinism out of moral conviction, but Khrushchev did," said writer and former prisoner Lev Razgon. Historian Roy Medvedev, who also spoke at the meeting, said that Khrushchev's fall in 1964 had provided a lesson that "dark forces" constantly fight to prevent genuine change. The meeting marked the ninety-fifth anniversary of Khrushchev's birth (AP, April 17; *Izvestia*, April 19).

**Rally in Vilnius**

Some 20,000 people were reported to have taken part in a rally in Vilnius devoted to the theme "Democracy and the Constitution." The rally was organized by the unofficial Lithuanian Democratic Party. The group's representative, Povilas Peceliunas, told RFE/RL that the rally approved a resolution saying there can be no genuine sovereignty if a nation is part of another state. According to Peceliunas, the resolution said "the occupation and annexation" of Lithuania brought about by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact is continuing. The Vilnius rally was permitted by the authorities. Members of other unofficial groups in the republic took part (Reuters, April 17).

**New Soviet Law Provides for  
Progressive Income Tax System**

Soviet workers will be subject to a new progressive tax system with a top rate of 50 percent, according to a draft law carried by TASS. Under the new proposals, the new rates will affect people earning more than 700 rubles a month, who will pay 15 percent. According to the draft, the rate will rise to 20 percent on earnings over 900 rubles a month, 30 percent on 1,100 rubles, 40 percent on 1,400 rubles, and 50 percent on 1,500 rubles and above. People earning less than 700 rubles a month will continue to pay the current flat rate of 13 percent which is levied on all incomes over 80 rubles a month. (The average wage is 234 rubles a month.) Observers believe that the new system is aimed at workers in the cooperative sector, whose wages are often higher than the average, but workers in the state sector who qualify for productivity bonuses could also be affected. The government proposed a progressive income tax last year on cooperative earnings, with a top tax bracket of 90 percent. That proposal was withdrawn following criticism that it would stifle the cooperative movement.

**Yazov Agrees to Some Lithuanian  
Military Service Demands**

Radio Vilnius said USSR Minister of Defense Dmitrii Yazov had agreed to allow Lithuanians to perform their military service in or near Lithuania when not posted abroad. The radio report said Yazov had agreed to the proposal at a meeting in Moscow with Lithuanian Party First Secretary Algirdas Brazauskas. On April 19, *Pravda* criticized demands that Soviet military conscripts be allowed to serve in locally raised units in their home republics. The author of the article, Lieutenant Colonel M. Zakharchik, said none of the

republics was capable of raising and maintaining its own army. He said unofficial groups in the Baltic republics are naive in demanding that conscripts serve at home.

#### **May Day Slogan Urges Rejection of Nationalism**

The Soviet leadership, facing an upsurge of national sentiment and unrest in many of the Soviet Union's republics, called on the country to reject nationalism and reinforce "Soviet patriotism." The appeal against nationalism appeared among slogans from the Party Central Committee issued every year in advance of the May Day holiday. Their formulation signals what Moscow sees as its key policy concerns. One slogan read: "People of the USSR! Preserve and develop the traditions of Socialist internationalism and Soviet patriotism! Deal a decisive rebuff to manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism!" (*Pravda*, April 16).

#### **Details Given of Soviet Missile Disaster in 1960**

AP quoted *Ogonek* (No. 16) as giving details of a missile disaster in the USSR in 1960. A fully fueled intercontinental ballistic missile exploded on the launchpad, killing a number of people, including the head of Soviet Rocket Forces at that time, Marshal of Artillery Mitrofan Nedelin. The magazine blamed the accident on the USSR's rush to catch up with the United States in the missile race and on the flouting of safety rules that resulted. It did not say how many died.

Monday, April 17

#### **Korotich Named International Editor of the Year**

The chief editor of *Ogonek*, Vitalii Korotich, was named international editor of the year by the New York-based magazine *World Press Review*. The *World Press Review* said that Korotich had in three years turned the publication from "a banal coffee-table magazine into a glossy publication resembling *Life* magazine and read by more than 3 million subscribers" (AP, April 18).

#### **Jakes Begins Soviet Visit**

Czechoslovak Party General Secretary Milos Jakes arrived in Moscow for an official visit. Speaking on Soviet television on April 16, Jakes said Czechoslovakia was devoting "very great attention" to *glasnost'* as a means of furthering democracy. On April 18, Jakes met in Moscow with Gorbachev (TASS, April 18).

#### **International Psychiatric Symposium Opens in Moscow**

An international symposium on law and psychiatry opened in Moscow. TASS said the Ministry of Health's chief psychiatric expert, Aleksandr Karpov, told the opening session that the Soviet authorities had abused the rights of mental patients. He said this practice must stop. Among those attending the Moscow meeting are representatives from the United States, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Two members of the recently created Soviet Association of Independent Psychiatrists, Viktor Lanovoi and Konstantin Karmanov, attended the opening session uninvited. Lanovoi

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told RFE/RL by telephone that they were formally introduced to the forum. He said he told the gathering that psychiatrists and neurologists who were not involved in the abuse of psychiatry for political purposes could join his organization.

Tuesday, April 18

#### **Soviet Military Planes to Deliver Vegetables**

A Soviet Air Force commander said military transport planes would begin delivering vegetables to various parts of the USSR in the next few days. Colonel General Vyacheslav Efanov said in *Izvestia* that military cargo planes would transport at least 50,000 tons of goods and equipment this year. Efanov said this was part of plans for Soviet Air Force pilots to take part in large-scale transport operations for civilian purposes. Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov said last week that military transport planes should do more to help the national economy.

#### **Controversy over AIDS in USSR**

Yurii Fedorov, the deputy director of the Main Epidemiological Administration of the USSR Ministry of Health, told *Sel'skaya zhizn'* that 570 HIV carriers have been identified in the Soviet Union. Of these, 378 are foreigners who have been expelled from the country. The other 192 are Soviet citizens. (Deputy Minister of Health Aleksandr Kondrusev told reporters at an international conference in Moscow last month that 176 Soviet citizens had been identified as HIV carriers.) Fedorov said that there have been seven officially registered cases of the disease in the USSR, four of them Soviet citizens. Three of these have died, and the fourth is an invalid. Despite these disturbing figures, Fedorov said that "we [the USSR] do not yet have an [AIDS] epidemic in the true sense of that word." This statement was challenged by Vadim Pokrovsky, president of the Soviet Association for the Struggle against AIDS, who told the newspaper that "the fact that 192 Soviet citizens are infected with the human immuno-deficiency virus and over fifty of them are children means that an epidemic has started." Pokrovsky emphasized that it is impossible to say exactly how quickly the disease will spread in the USSR: "we do not have basic data on how many homosexuals, drug addicts, and prostitutes there are in this country." He predicted, however, that it would spread quickly, "and not only in the big cities."

#### **Opinion Poll on Political Sympathies**

The magazine *Vek XX i mir* (No. 3) published the results of a poll into the attitude of different sectors of the Soviet population to political and economic reforms. Those polled were asked, among other things, to rate on a five-point scale the popularity of the following people: Tsar Nicholas II, Lenin, Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Yurii Andropov, Leonid Brezhnev, Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris El'tsin, Egor Ligachev, Aleksandr Yakovlev, Andrei Sakharov, Fidel Castro, Ronald Reagan, and Deng Xiaoping. Brezhnev got the lowest rating from all the groups, Lenin, the highest; Gorbachev came second, and El'tsin third. The poll was conducted in Moscow in November

and December, 1988, by the Soviet Sociological Association. Those who conducted the poll divided the respondents, who totaled 1,231, into six groups according to their political preferences and, specifically, according their ideas about the kind of *perestroika* they would like to see. These groups were (1) "pragmatic-Westernizers"; (2) "renewers" (supporters of "social justice"); (3) "gosudarstvenniki" (disciplinarians, or supporters of a strong state); (4) "Greens"; (5) "patriots"; and (6) "obyvateli" (those holding consumerist values). Groups (1) and (2) supported Gorbachev's policies, while group (6) was apolitical and had little interest in *perestroika*.

#### Farmers' Attitudes to Land Leasing

*Pravda* reported on an opinion poll of 176 collective farm chairmen in Kursk Oblast. Nearly 60 percent of the respondents evaluated the new system of land leasing positively, though only 20 percent gave an unequivocal "yes" when asked whether they thought it was the best way of improving Soviet agriculture. Just under 50 percent expressed some doubts about the new system, while 20 percent expressed a firmly negative attitude, saying they thought leasing would aggravate an already complicated situation. Fifty percent said they saw land leasing as a step toward the restoration of capitalism, while 4 percent called it "a concession to capitalism." Many of the collective farm-chairmen polled said they based their own negative attitudes on the reluctance of the members of their collective farms to embark on a new undertaking.

Wednesday, April 19

#### Academician Apologizes to Sakharov

The USSR Academy of Sciences began a two-day conference to elect deputies for its twelve unfilled seats in the Congress of People's Deputies. At the meeting, one of the academicians, Sergei Vonsovsky, took the floor to apologize to Academician Andrei Sakharov, who is one of the nominees, for signing letters attacking him during the hate campaign against Sakharov in the Soviet press in the 1970s. "I acted very badly," Vonsovsky said in front of hundreds of top Soviet scientists. "I am offering a profound apology" (AP, April 19). Vonsovsky is a physicist who specializes in magnetism. He signed several letters condemning Sakharov, including one published in *Pravda* on August 29, 1973, that said that Sakharov had stopped his scientific activities and was devoting himself entirely to anti-Sovietism. He also signed a letter written by many members of the Academy protesting against the awarding of the Nobel Prize for Peace to Sakharov in 1975 (*Izvestia*, October 26, 1975).

#### Soviet Prosecutor Criticizes Churbanov Trial

Telman Gdlyan, the chief of the inquiry group appointed to investigate corruption in the USSR Public Prosecutor's Office, was quoted by Radio Kiev as saying there were irregularities in the trial of Yuri Churbanov, son-in-law of the late Leonid Brezhnev. Gdlyan said there was evidence of connections between bribe takers in Uzbekistan and representatives of

the Public Prosecutor's Office, the court, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He did not elaborate. (Churbanov was sentenced to serve twelve years' deprivation of freedom on corruption charges.) The same day, *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya* carried a report on the conditions under which Churbanov was serving his sentence. The newspaper's reporter, who visited the camp where Churbanov is serving his term, said Churbanov appeared to have an easier time than the other prisoners.

#### Sunken Soviet Nuclear Submarine Still Not Located

Soviet search teams have so far failed to locate the Soviet nuclear submarine that caught fire and sank near the Norwegian coast twelve days ago, killing forty-two crew members. *Izvestia* said it was still too early to say whether the stricken submarine would be raised to the surface. On April 21, *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya* carried an article that included accounts by people who survived the accident. The survivors, who included the captain of the submarine, complained that the majority of the victims died not in the fire but because there was insufficient emergency safety equipment aboard the submarine.

#### Turkey Agrees to Credit Deal with USSR

TASS said Turkey had agreed to extend credits worth 150 million US dollars to the Soviet Union. TASS said the deal was signed in Ankara on April 18. The agency reported on April 19 that most of the credits would be used to buy Turkish consumer goods.

#### Editor Discusses His Journal's Problems with Censorship

A Soviet editor, Gleb Pavlovsky, commented on his journal's problems with censorship in an interview with RFE/RL. Pavlovsky works for the Soviet Peace Committee monthly *Vek XX i mir*. The monthly recently published Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *Live Not by Lies!* (In an earlier interview with RFE/RL, the chief editor of *Vek XX i mir* said that he had published Solzhenitsyn without asking the permission of the USSR's main censoring body, Glavlit.) Pavlovsky said the monthly had been involved in "a dispute" with "some circles of the apparatus," whom he identified as "Party bureaucrats" and "some circles of the KGB." He said they had been putting pressure on the leadership of the Soviet Peace Committee, demanding the removal of "this or that material from the issue." In its turn, the leadership of the committee had passed on these demands to the monthly's editorial board. Pavlovsky said the conflict had reached "a very critical stage" before a meeting on April 18 between members of the editorial board of the monthly and the leadership of the peace committee. He said it had now been decided to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. Pavlovsky named two items in the April issue of *Vek XX i mir* that had aroused criticism. One is a letter from a Ukrainian reader demanding public control over the KGB. The other is an article examining various alternatives for the future development of the USSR and possible forms of Western assistance. Pavlovsky said censorship is still a problem not only for his journal but for the Soviet press as a whole.

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**Party Chief Says Perestroika  
Not Catching On in  
Turkmenistan**

The first secretary of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan, Saparmurad Niyazov, said *perestroika* was not catching on in his republic. In an interview with *Izvestia* he said there was no sign of *perestroika* in the activities of the republic's Council of Ministers or its State Planning Committee. He said nobody in the republic wanted to take responsibility for the economy. Niyazov also criticized the republic's Party, saying its Central Committee's analysis of economic reform in Turkmenistan was lacking.

**Gorbachev Meets  
US Labor Leaders**

In a speech to visiting US labor leaders Mikhail Gorbachev commented on US-Soviet relations. He called for the continuation of the US-Soviet dialogue and added that differences between the two countries were by no means a tragedy but a stimulus for deepening cooperation (TASS, in English, April 20).

Thursday, April 20

**Elections of Congress Deputies  
in Academy of Sciences**

At the end of a two-day meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences, TASS reported the preliminary results of voting by the Academy for its twelve unfilled seats in the Congress of People's Deputies. Academicians Andrei Sakharov and Roal'd Sagdeev were reported to have been elected, together with other members and employees of the Academy known for their reformist stands. Sakharov received 806 votes and Sagdeev 739 of 1,101 votes cast. Reform-minded economist Nikolai Shmelev received the most votes—869. (Three other reformist economists—Nikolai Petrakov, Pavel Bunich, and Gennadii Lisichkin—were also elected). Another successful candidate was Academician Georgii Arbatov, an expert on the United States. His candidacy drew some protests at the election meeting because of his association with Brezhnev. Also elected was corresponding member of the Academy Sergei Averintsev, a specialist in the history of Christianity, who can be expected to do a lot in the Congress to defend the rights of religious believers in the USSR. Two other elected deputies—a specialist in social sciences, Yurii Karyakin, and philologist Vyacheslav Ivanov—have had serious conflicts with the authorities in the past. Academician Vitalii Ginzburg, who also won election, has attracted a lot of attention for his articles in the Soviet press criticizing bureaucracy within the Academy. Another elected deputy—Doctor of Law Aleksandr Yakovlev—is a leading figure in the current campaign to improve the Soviet legal system. The evening television news program "Vremya" carried a commentary on the elections in the Academy. Corresponding member of the Academy A. Yablokov said the whole story of the nomination of candidates and the election of deputies to the Congress demonstrated that the Academy is very disorganized. (The Academy's Presidium provoked an outcry in January when it rejected Andrei Sakharov and several other reformist academicians as candidates. At elections last month, only eight of the twenty-three candidates nominated for the Academy's twenty seats won a sufficient number of votes.) Yablokov

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**Construction of Two Reactors  
at Chernobyl' Canceled**

made a proposal to organize an association called "The Union of Scientists," which would be independent of the Academy of Sciences.

The Soviet government has abandoned plans to build two new reactors at the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant. The decision by the USSR Council of Ministers was announced six days before the third anniversary of the Chernobyl' disaster. TASS quoted First Deputy Chief of the Council's Fuel and Energy Bureau Vladimir Marin as saying the Council of Ministers had also ordered a halt to the construction of a fourth reactor at the Smolensk power plant and a sixth reactor at the Kursk plant.

**Soviet Embassy in  
Kabul Damaged**

The Soviet embassy in Kabul was damaged by a rocket fired by the Afghan resistance. No one in the complex was reported hurt. Heavy fighting was reported on April 20 at the Kabul end of the Salang highway, which links the capital with the Soviet border and is the main route for supply convoys (*Reuters*, *UPI*, April 20). On April 21, Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadii Gerasimov threatened Soviet retaliation for the rocket attack on the Soviet embassy (*Reuters*, April 21).

**Lithuanians Send Resolution on  
Economic Reform to Moscow**

Lithuanian delegates to the Congress of People's Deputies have appealed to the central Soviet authorities to allow Lithuania to carry out its own plan for economic self-rule. Professor Kazimieras Antanavicius, a member of the council of Sajudis and a delegate to the new Congress, told RFE/RL that a resolution to this effect was passed overwhelmingly at a meeting of the Lithuanian delegates in Vilnius on April 19. According to Antanavicius, the resolution said the draft program for economic self-management adopted last month was superficial. It said more far-reaching reforms were needed. The resolution demands that Lithuania be allowed to implement its own plan for economic self-rule beginning next year (*RFE/RL Special*, April 20).

**Dozens Feared Killed  
in Georgian Landslide**

Dozens of people are feared dead in Georgia after a landslide caused a river to flood. TASS said the disaster struck the village of Tsablana in the Adzharia region of the republic, but it did not say when. TASS said over 2,000 families had been evacuated from the region in recent days following a series of landslides, avalanches, and spring floods.

Friday, April 21

**Medvedev Speaks  
at Celebrations of  
Lenin's Birthday**

A special meeting was held in the Kremlin to mark the anniversary of Lenin's birth. The main speech was delivered by Politburo member Vadim Medvedev who said that recent elections to the Congress of People's Deputies had been a major victory for *perestroika*. He added, however, that more work is needed to continue Gorbachev's reform drive. He

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complained that there were some people who, under the flag of "street democracy" pursued extremist goals. He said extremism and nationalism were not the way to solve major problems (*Central Television, TASS, April 21*).

**Home-Made Bombs Found  
in Moscow Subway**

At a press briefing, Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadii Gerasimov reported that on April 20 KGB officers and members of the Moscow subway security forces had found home-made bombs at two subway stations. The bombs were found at the Paveletskaya and the VDNKh stations. Gerasimov said it was thought that the same person was responsible for both bombs. He said the KGB was investigating the matter (*TASS, April 21*).

**Soviet Writers Demand  
Abolition of Writers' Union**

Soviet television broadcast a special program devoted to the first meeting in March of the newly created committee "April". Pisateli v podderzhku perestroiki" (April: Writers in Support of *Perestroika*). Many of the speakers at the meeting demanded the abolition of the USSR Writers' Union, which they said had completely discredited itself.

(RL 201/89, April 21, 1989)



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