62. Problems with economics education in Uzbekistan have been well-documented in an article by Haideh Salehi-Esfahani and Judy Thornton, 'The dilemma of reforming economics education in the post-socialist economy of Uzbekistan: has anything changed?', *Central Asian Survey*, Vol 17, No 2, 1998, pp 253–265.
63. See S. Frederick Starr, 'Making Eurasia stable', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 75, No 1, January/February 1996, pp 80–92.
64. Shafiqul Islam has made the following analysis: 'The macroeconomic dislocations ... from this process of 'trade destruction' ... have not been remotely compensated by progress in "trade creation" with the rest of the world. ... Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have expanded trade with countries outside the former Soviet Union ... but the expansion and the resulting increase ... remain marginal.' 'Capitalism on the Silk Road', *Current History*, Vol 93, No 582, April 1994, p 158.

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Society and politics in Bukhara, 1868–1920

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When Sadriddin Ayni set out to write a history of the Bukharan revolution of 1920, he began his account with a history of education in Bukhara 'because the question of the reform of maktabs and madrasas was the cause of the first stirrings of the Bukharan revolution'.[1] Ayni was a leading figure in the reformist movement that, with Soviet help, overthrew the amir, and his account of events has provided the basis for much of what has been written on Bukharan politics in the last years of the old regime.[2] It is fair to say that Ayni's basic narrative—the rise of educational reform of the Jadids as a movement of enlightenment and progress; virulent opposition to it by venal ulama, despotic amirs, and duplicitous Russian functionaries; and its ultimate triumph in 1920—provides the framework within which all accounts of the Bukharan revolution operate, regardless of the political or methodological inclinations of their authors. However, while subsequent authors have kept Ayni's basic narrative structure, they have often jettisoned the extremely rich detail of Ayni's work. The Jadids thus become the main motors of Bukharan history, and their development as a political force not just the primary, but the sole dynamic of Bukharan history. The difficulties experienced by the Jadids in Bukhara also fit well with the conventional picture of the emirate as a centre of reaction in which fanaticism and zealotry reigned supreme. In many ways, the focus on the Jadids reflects a common bias in scholarship on Muslim societies, in which modernists are often the only groups deemed worthy of study, while traditional elites are often ignored. All too often, modernist reform in Muslim societies is rendered synonymous with the march of history; the point is to historicize the advent of modernism.

My intent in this article is revisionist. I wish to re-examine the nature of internal politics in Bukhara under the protectorate to uncover dimensions that scholars of Jadidism have usually glossed over. This involves paying greater attention to the logic of social and political competition among the ulama, and between them and the amirs. These, I argue, were the defining vectors of political life in the emirate up until 1917. When Jadidism appeared in the first

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decade of the twentieth century, it was a marginal current in a political field dominated by these struggles, and it was greatly affected by them.[3] There can be little doubt that attempts by the Jadids to establish new-method schools provoked bitter opposition in Bukhara, and this opposition was central to the evolution of Bukharan Jadidism. But it is incorrect to argue the reverse, that opposition to Jadidism was the central political issue in Bukhara, or that the opposition was motivated solely by fear of the new schools. For one, non-traditional education was not entirely new in Bukhara in 1908, for as we shall see below, Russian authorities had opened a 'russo-native' school (in which Russian and arithmetic were taught alongside the traditional topics of the maktab) in the old city of Bukhara in 1894, with the amir himself providing a building. Ayni does not mention this school at all and its existence has seldom been noted by other scholars. Even if the 'native' section of these schools never saw the new method (we cannot be certain), the fact of the existence of their Russian section would still cast doubt on the adequacy of Ayni's narrative of the enmity of the ulama to modern education as an explanatory device. Rather, I argue that new-method schools provoked such bitter opposition because the ulama seized upon them as a surrogate for other conflicts in Bukharan society which had little to do with the phonetic method of teaching the alphabet. New-method schools became a straw man of the ulama precisely because they could be used to fight more important battles.

The details of this politics are not self-evident. The ulama lived in a world of face-to-face interaction in which debates were seldom recorded in writing (and almost never in print), while the logic of their struggles was opaque to outsiders, even those who were contemporaries. Nevertheless, careful reading of appropriate sources can shed considerable light on the matter. The copious writings of Ayni himself constitute the most fruitful source here. Ayni was a mudarris at Kokaltâsh madrasa for several years before 1917 and very much an insider in the city's scholarly elite. Although Ayni's histories of the Bukharan revolution are governed by a master narrative that privileges the Jadids, they also contain rich detail of the politics of the ulama that have escaped serious scholarly attention. In addition, the archives of the Russian Political Agency in Kâgân and the seldom used writings of Bukharan exiles in the Ottoman press also provide insights that have hitherto been unavailable to scholars. Taken together, these sources allow us to compile a more complete picture of Bukharan politics and of Jadidism's place in it.

Bukhara under the Protectorate

The Russian conquest of Central Asia was a boon for the amirs of Bukhara, for it allowed them to consolidate their power in a way their predecessors had only been able to dream of. There were two sources of opposition to their authority: the tribal chiefs and the ulama. The power of the tribal chiefs lay in their control of the countryside, where they had the right to raise taxes and levy troops.[4] All amirs had to contend with the power of tribal chiefs, whom they could disregard

only at their peril. Since the end of the 18th century, the amirs of the Manghit dynasty had striven to contain the power of the tribal chiefs. They succeeded to some degree in this task, but only by putting power in the hands of people directly obedient to them. In the 1830s, amir Nasrullah created a small standing army staffed largely by outsiders, such as Iranian and Qalmuq slaves. Similarly, he began a tradition of entrusting Iranians with considerable power at court that continued down to the beginning of the 20th century. Such developments tilted the balance of power in favour of the amirs, but their victory was never complete. The rulers of Shahr-i Sabz especially maintained their *de facto* independence down to the Russian conquest.[5]

The sources of the ulama's authority lay in the cultural capital that accrued from their possession of sacred knowledge and (often, but not always) claims to august lineage. This cultural capital was transmitted through the knowledge produced and reproduced in the madrasas of Bukhara, for which the city was well known throughout Central Asia and beyond. Cultural capital could be put to good use: many ulama rose to positions of power through intermarriage with the ruling family. Such connections provided the amirs with legitimacy and access to august lineages, while also placing considerable authority in the hands of the ulama.[6] Such alliances were especially important for the early Manghits, whose Chingissid credentials were suspect. The sister of Amir Haydar (r. 1800–1820) was married to Sayyid Ahmad Khoja, a descendent of Sayyid Ata. As brother-in-law to the amir, Sayyid Ahmad served as governor of Chârjuy and Qarshi, and held numerous other posts in Samarqand and Bukhara.[7] The ulama also provided a means for mediating disputes between the amirs and their governors.[8] The ulama also controlled vast amounts of waqf property, and in addition, enjoyed tax immunities granted by individual amirs. Madrasa students also shared in the benefits of cultural authority. They received a share of their madrasa's waqf income, were immune from taxation and were entitled to respect. They also had the right to extract this respect by force. In 1877, a group of students clashed with several members of the local Shi'i community who had insulted them.[9] Several years later, in the early 1890s, another group of students stoned a carriage driver to death for showing disrespect.[10]

It bears repeating, however, that the relationship of the amirs with both the tribal chiefs and the ulama was dynamic. Amir Nasrullah, who curbed, to a great extent, the power of the chiefs, was said to have paid little attention to the ulama at the beginning of his reign.[11] This changed during the turbulent years of the Russian invasion, when the ulama asserted themselves. As Russian armies approached, Muzaffar showed little interest in taking them on, preferring instead to continue his campaign against Kokand. In Bukhara, however, Ishân Baqâ Khoja Sadr, the *ra'is* and other leading ulama affixed their seals to a fatwa proclaiming holy war against the Russians. They led a massive crowd to the amir's palace, demanding that he begin hostilities.[12] In Samarqand, where the populace had already been complaining about the exactions of the governor, Sher Ali Inâq, the ulama led madrasa students in a similar protest against the amir's inaction. The protest turned into a riot, which was brutally suppressed by

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loyal troops, with large numbers of students and many leading ulama of the city being massacred.[13]

The amir was, however, forced to fight. The result was disastrous, as the amir's armies, largely untrained and very poorly armed, proved no match for the Russians. The Russians annexed large parts of the emirate (which formed the province of Turkestan), but stopped short of total conquest. Instead, Bukhara was placed under a protectorate, in which Russia controlled the external affairs of the emirate, but left the amir largely unfettered in dealing with internal affairs.

In not proceeding with the conquest, which they surely could have accomplished, the Russians were acting under a number of constraints. There was concern, in the Foreign Ministry at least, over how expansion in Central Asia would affect relations with Britain. There was also concern in the Ministry of Finance over the cost of administering vast new territories situated a great distance away from the heartland of the empire.[14] All parties were concerned with the thinness of Russian rule on the ground, and the ability of a small number of Russians to hold and rule a large, hostile indigenous population. Here, the 'fanaticism' of the local population became a key word in the vocabulary of the Russians. This 'fanaticism', which was deemed to inhere in Islam, rendered the local population extremely dangerous to Russia. The antidote to fanaticism was enlightenment, but for the Russians this remained a long term goal. In the meantime, extreme care had to be taken to ensure that no cause was given for the fanaticism to explode into rebellion against Russian rule. The establishment of a protectorate over Bukhara answered all these concerns.[15] (Military conquest had its own logic, however, and the campaigns of the 1860s left the Russians in possession of substantial territory, which was transformed into the Russian province of Turkestan in 1867, and which constantly expanded until 1889.) The amir of Bukhara had become a guarantor of the stability of Russian rule in Central Asia.

Muzaffar utilized this situation brilliantly to his own purposes. To his own population, he portrayed himself as the last remaining Muslim ruler in Central Asia, and thus a defender of the last bastion of Islam in the region. With the Russians at the gates, traditional practices came to be valorized as the measure of true Islam and Muzaffar fashioned himself as the upholder of local ('Islamic') traditions. It should be emphasized that this traditionalist stance did not mean that traditions continued inviolate and unchanged. As we shall see, Bukhara underwent substantial socioeconomic and political change in the Russian period. Rather, this traditionalism was a political posture that sought to ground the amirs' legitimacy in their avowed defence of tradition. As suitable analogy may here be drawn with the Saudi regime's claims to defend 'pure Islam' today, even as its everyday political practices are determined quite pragmatically.

To the Russians, he presented himself as the best means of keeping the 'fanaticism' of the local population in check, provided the Russians did not interfere in everyday life in the emirate. Muzaffar and his successors constantly made this argument to keep Russian interference at bay: it was trotted out to prevent troops from being stationed in Bukhara and even to keep out unwanted

advice about hygiene and public health (as happened with a commission from St Petersburg in 1895).[16] At the same time, by giving the Russians a stake in keeping him and his descendants on the throne, Muzaffar was able greatly to strengthen his position internally. The protectorate put paid to the power of the tribal chiefs (some of whom went into exile; others were imprisoned; yet others incorporated into Russian forces). While governors still ruled as they pleased—the amirs did not develop any centralized bureaucratic infrastructure to deal with the everyday concerns of administering justice and raising revenue—they no longer had the option of rising in rebellion against the amir, for that would bring Russian troops in. The Russians also were to guarantee the succession of the amirs. Finally, while Muzaffar lost large parts of his domain to the Russians (most significantly, the province of Samarqand), the loss was to some degree mitigated by the fact that the Russians made other rulers in Central Asia cede territory to the Bukhara. Thus Muzaffar acquired territory of the right bank of the Amu Darya from Khiva and expanded in the Pamirs, where Darwâz and Qarategin came under his control.

With the decline in the power of the tribal chiefs and governors came an increase in the authority of two figures appointed by the amirs: the qushbegi, the chief administrator of the land and the executor of the amir's will (a *vazîr* in the classic Perso–Islamic sense), and the *qâzi kalân*, the chief judge. During the Russian period, the qushbegis came from the lineage of one Muhammadi Bey, a Persian slave of amir Nasrullah, who had been adopted into the royal household and been given the hand of the amir's daughter in marriage.[17] Being personally tied to the amirs, and Shi'i to boot, the qushbegis were safely removed from the politics of the Ozbek tribal chiefs who had given the amirs so much trouble. The qâzi kalân was appointed from among the ulama, whose politics will be discussed in greater detail below.

The conquest was also beneficial for the amirs personally. As Bukhara was incorporated into the global economy, the amirs further developed their long standing trading interests to acquire fabulous wealth for themselves. In 1910, amir Abdulahad had vast interests in the export of cotton and astrakhan wool to Russia and abroad.[18] In 1920, when the last amir, Âlimkhân, approached the British for help in transporting his wealth abroad in case he had to flee, he was worth £35 million.[19] The amirs used this wealth well to maintain good personal relations with Russian elites. They developed quite a reputation for philanthropy to Russian causes. In 1878, Muzaffar and his heir apparent donated 6000 rubles for the benefit of Russian troops wounded in the recent war with the Ottomans,[20] and over the following decades, they made a habit of generosity toward Russian institutions and persons, which helped a great deal in smoothing over awkward political situations.[21]

The world of the ulama

Muzaffar had not forgotten the uprisings of the ulama in 1866. Once peace was restored, he acted quickly to assert his authority over them. Baqâ Khoja was sent

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off to Qarakol as qazi (where he was assassinated).[22] Other leaders of the uprising were met similar fates. But more significant was the long term effects of Muzaffar's policies toward the ulama. To meet the needs of a treasury emptied by war on several fronts, he confiscated many waqfs. Over the next few years, he proceeded to turn the ulama into a subservient estate. On the one hand, he created numerous sinecures for readers of prayers at his palace. He also revived the old Bukharan tradition of the *dehyak*, a stipend given by the amir to madrasa students, as a way of buying the loyalties of the ulama. Moreover, to break the power of local ulama, Muzaffar brought in Sadriddin Khuttalâni from Kulâb in eastern Bukhara as qâzi kalân. It was Sadriddin's son Badriddin, however, who as qâzi kalân under Abdulahad, really extended his network of patronage to bring the ulama to heel. He favoured his own students for the numerous teaching appointments he controlled, which led all the major ulama of the city to send their sons to be his students. The amirs also used appointments to offices and ranks as levers to enhance their position *vis-à-vis* the ulama.[23] While the amirs could not completely disregard scholarly credentials in making appointments, they nevertheless could choose between similarly qualified candidates. The ranks of qâzi kalân, *a'lam* (short for *a'lam al-'ulamâ*, 'the most learned of the learned', an honorary rank), *ra'is* (responsible for maintaining order in the bazaars and the streets), and *âkhund* were all filled by the ulama. Ranks brought both a title and access to income (but not a salary), but also the necessity to generate income.[24] Every new appointment occasioned 'gifts' and other payments (*hadiya, peshkash*) by the appointee to the amir, who was always in need of revenue. In the absence of salaries, functionaries were left to their own devices to raise money for themselves. Appointees from the ulama were not immune from this; indeed, official posts became lucrative opportunities for financial gain, as muftis and qazis charged large sums of money for affixing their seals to documents.[25]

The state's control of the ulama was never complete. The ulama's cultural capital was accumulated independently of the amirs, yet, the constraints placed on them by the amirs were very real. Many ulama seem to have accommodated themselves well to the new situation, but tensions remained. As A. Semenov noted, Bukharan ulama exercised the right of *non possimus* ('we may not') often and thus stymied initiatives from the amirs that they did not like.[26] And when the opportunity arose, they asserted their power against the amir through agitation. But open agitation also brought to the fore divisions *among* the ulama. In order to understand the paths this agitation took, and the resources that the ulama could mobilize in it, we need to comprehend the world of the Bukharan ulama.

Bukhara's status as the most important major centre of Islamic learning in Central Asia was not affected by the Russian conquest. Students continued to arrive in Bukhara from all over Central Asia. This scholarly population was of central importance both to the economy and the politics of the city, especially since it was not neatly contained in a few places. In the late 18th century, many madrasas were in such bad repair (a result of the dislocation that had marked

much of that century) that Shâh Murâd (r. 1785–1800) issued a decree permitting the sale and resale of individual cells if the purchaser undertook repairs. Owners of cells were entitled to receive a portion of the waqf income of the madrasa and enjoyed many other privileges.[27] As a result, many cells passed into the private ownership of people who may not have any connection with the world of learning, although the majority of the inhabitants of madrasas continued to be students. There was no expectation that students would study at the madrasa of their residence; indeed, there were no lectures given at the majority of the madrasas. The most careful estimate of the number of madrasas in Bukhara at the turn of the 20th century puts the number at 80. Of these, lectures were given at only 22.[28] The rest functioned as dormitories and means of dispensing waqf income to students and professors. The madrasas were spread out all over the city, giving the impression of a city-wide campus.

This impression was further strengthened by the fact that lectures were given by ulama in their own right, and not as appointees of an institution. The student–teacher bond was initiated when a student offered a gift, the *iftitâhâna*, to a professor, who by accepting it, consented to having the students attend his lectures. This relation was not mediated by the madrasa as an institution. Students were expected to proceed through a list of books to finish their education, but they were under no compulsion to stick with the same mudarris. They could attend the lectures of whichever mudarris they chose to.[29] For the ulama, an appointment as the mudarris of a certain madrasa meant the right to receive income from the waqf of that madrasa. Individual ulama could have more than one appointment, as well as any number of other ranks. Truly prominent ulama held several professorships as well as ranks of qazi and mufti, each of which had their own source of income.

Thus, the world of the Bukharan ulama was a small one in which rivalries and conflicts were commonplace. The most important sources of discord among the ulama at this period was clearly competition over ranks and appointments. As we shall see, the assertion of the power of the ulama against the state, and a struggle over the possession of the post of qâzi kalân defined the dynamics of Bukharan politics in the period under consideration. At the same time, disputes over dogma and the correct interpretation of Islam also divided the ulama. Antagonists were organized in two main factions held together by ties of mutual obligation among equals, and by patron–client relationships among those of different social ranks. Leading ulama could count on the intense loyalty of current and past students. The roots of this division, as it existed in the period under review, went back to amir Muzaffar's appointment as qâzi kalân of Sadriddin Khutallâni, who brought with him new actors to the scene who began to encroach on the authority and the sources of income the local ulama had long taken for granted. As a result, the ulama of Bukhara and their students divided into the Bukhâri (or Tumâni) and Kulâbi (or Kuhistâni) factions, which competed fiercely for status and rank.[30] Leading ulama could mobilize support among the large population of students in the city who retained a considerable potential for trouble. This allowed ulama who did not fit neatly into the Bukhâri/Kulâbi divide (among

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prominent ulama in Bukhara were men from all over Central Asia, and as far away as the Volga basin) to build a constituency for themselves. For instance, Mufti Abdurrâziq Sudur, who was from Ferghana himself, counted on the support of the large number of students from Ferghana.[31]

The competition among the ulama varied greatly in intensity, from satirical verse to threatening opponents with violence and mass agitation.[32] Nevertheless, the language in which these struggles were carried out was that of Islam, as is to be expected of a cultural elite immersed in a sacralized culture. All factional disputes among the ulama became imbued with a sacral tinge and were played out as debates over the proper interpretation of Islam. Generally speaking, ulama of the Bukhâri faction assumed a purist posture through which they criticized the Kulâbis (who were the dominant faction) for several practices widespread in Bukhara, but that were contrary to the letter of the law.[33] These included the buying and selling madrasa cells, which as waqf property, could not properly be bought and sold, charging money for affixing seals to documents (and indeed selling blank documents with seals attached), and the use only of glosses and commentaries in madrasas. The most vocal proponent of this faction was Hâji Mufti Dâmlâ Ikrâm (known popularly as Ikrâmcha), a popular mudarris who travelled to Istanbul on his way to the hajj and who had a very loyal following among the students of the city.[34] He will feature prominently in the account below. His outspokenness had, however, earned him the reputation of a maverick among his peers, which often turned into a political liability.

The specifically religious language of debate surrounding the new-method schools strikes the contemporary reader as the sure sign of a theocratic society. We need to remember, however, that it was the only language available to the antagonists. The stakes, however, were quite worldly and quite considerable: control of vast sources of income and status and prestige, as well as influence over affairs of state. All of these features can be seen in the struggles of 1908–1914.

The beginnings of reform

For all the traditionalism of the amirs, the integration of Bukhara into the global economy had proceeded apace and produced its own imperatives. The necessity of mastering the skills necessary for doing commerce with Russia and the rest of the world was increasingly felt by local merchants. In 1891, a number of Bukharan merchants, Muslims as well as Jews, invited a certain I.V. Sivenko to Bukhara to teach their children Russian and arithmetic. Once he arrived, however, Sivenko encountered 'difficulties' in getting the requisite permission from the qushbegi and turned to the Russian Political Agency for help, which obliged him with a letter asking the qushbegi 'to give the said Sivenko all possible help in opening the school and to protect him from all difficulties'.[35] The permission was ultimately obtained, on condition that Sivenko's school should also feature traditional instruction by a mullah, and that the time spent by Sivenko should not exceed that by the mullah. This would have in effect made

Sivenko's schools into a 'russo-native' school like those pioneered in Turkestan by Russian since 1884. (In such schools, a Russian teacher taught Russian and arithmetic in the morning, while in the afternoon, a maktab teacher gave lessons identical to those in a traditional maktab, although by the turn of the century, many Muslim teachers in these schools in Turkestan had begun using the new method.)[36] However, having received permission, Sivenko left Bukhara for reasons not clear and the school never opened. The following year, therefore, the same merchants petitioned the amir to allow the opening of a 'russo-native' school in Bukhara. The amir granted permission in 1894, as a gesture to mark the ascension to the throne of Nicholas II,[37] and the school duly opened and flourished briefly, attaining an enrollment of 40 students at one point, before deteriorating rapidly. It was reopened with much pomp and ceremony, on 10 September 1897, with more than 15 Bukharan dignitaries present to hear the Political Agent, V.I. Ignat'ev wax eloquent on the benefits of learning Russian.[38] With a Russian teacher, O. Stepanov, in charge, the school began anew and remained in existence down to 1917. Another such school opened in Chârjuy in 1915, its expenses being borne by the *hâkim* of Chârjuy himself, in whose house it operated.[39] The absence of any opposition to these Russian schools is telling and we will return to it below.[40]

By the beginning of the 20th century, the pragmatic concerns that underlay the demand for russo–native schools, had turned into a systematic dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in Bukhara, as the merchants chafed at the arbitrary rule of the amir and his functionaries, and looked enviously at the (relatively) stable rule of law in neighbouring Turkestan. These concerns brought Bukharan and Tatar merchants together with certain ulama and a fledgling group of new intellectuals in an unlikely alliance advocating reform. The most important names involved in the reform movement bear this out. Mansur Sabitov was a millionaire Tatar merchant who had long lived in Bukhara. As a wealthy Russian subject, he had entrée at the Russian Political Agency in Kâgân. Usmân Khojaev was related to Latif Khojaev, 'one of the wealthiest, most solid and best known merchants' of Bukhara. Similarly, Fayzullah Khojaev, who in 1917 emerged as a significant figure and was later to become president of the People's Republic established by the revolution, was the son of a very wealthy merchant.[41] Abdurrauf Fitrat, the most influential writer among the reformers, was also the son of a merchant, although apparently not a very wealthy one. Sadriddin Ayni, on the other hand, was the son of a village imam from Ghijduvân, whose most important asset was a madrasa education. Very similar was the case of Abdul-wâhid Munzim.[42] What Ayni and Munzim both shared was the patronage of Sharifjân Makhdum, a notable whose father had been qâzi kalân in the 1880s, before being supplanted by Burhâniddin. His family controlled land in the provinces and maintained networks of patronage in the capital. Sharifjân was also a leading figure in the city's literary life; he wrote under the pen name of Sadr-i Ziyâ and his house was the scene of constant literary activity.[43] The reformers also attracted the sympathy of Mufti Ikrâm, who soon became an active supporter.

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The search for modern schooling remained at the centre of the reformers' efforts, which soon extended to attempts to establish new-method schools (then becoming widespread in the Crimea and the Volga region). In 1900, a certain Mullâ Jurabây, a maktab teacher who had encountered new-method schools during his travels in the Volga region, established one in the Pustinduzân quarter of the city. But although several people provided help, it soon closed for lack of interest among the populace.[44] The considerable Tatar community in Bukhara opened a school in Kâgân in 1903, but it too closed quickly for unknown reasons.[45] The first successful new-method school in Bukhara was opened again by the Tatars in 1907, in the mansion of Nizamiddin Sabitov, a prominent merchant. Students were taught by Abdurrahman Saadi, who was later to find fame as a professor of literature in Soviet Uzbekistan. The school was a well kept secret, and Ayni and Munzim knew nothing of it when they discovered the new method for themselves on a visit to Samarqand. There they visited the school run by Abdulqâdir Shakuri, the oldest in the city, and as Ayni tells us, were so impressed by its efficiency that they decided to start their own school in Bukhara.[46]

Both Ayni and Munzim had solid credentials as members of the city's cultural elite. The first reaction among their acquaintances to their opening the school was one of consternation, rather than hostility. Mufti Ikrâm, when he first learned that Ayni and Munzim planned to open a school, was surprised that they were taking on the low-status job of a maktab teacher.[47] Loss of status was his primary concern. Ikrâm was won over quickly—his own son Abdurrahmân enrolled in the school and the son's rapid acquisition of literacy convinced the father of the usefulness of the school. The school began successfully enough on 5 November 1908 in Munzim's house in the Sallâhkhâna quarter of Bukhara. The first class had twelve pupils who were taught primarily by Munzim. Ayni audited classes at the Tatar school to acquaint himself with methods of teaching and the textbooks used.

The reformers' activity broadened beyond the school. In late February 1909, nine men (including the founders of the school as well as Sabitov and Saadi) joined together to form the Bukhara Company (Shirkat-i Bukhârâ-yi Sharîf) in order to publish books for the school. Its first venture was to publish *Tartîl*, a booklet by Ayni outlining the rules for reciting the Qur'an, for use in the school. Ayni asserts that the company began with an initial capital of all of 77 rubles, but clearly some of its supporters had deep pockets, for the company also despatched two young men, Usmân Khoja and Hâmid Khoja Mehri, to Bahchesaray to meet with Gasprinskii and learn more about schools and teaching. The two then spent three months in Istanbul, visiting schools and buying books. The school and its related activities were supported by many substantial merchants, Tatar as well as Bukharan, as well as notables such as Sharifjân Makhdum. In November 1909, a group of Bukharans and Tatars organized a secret society called Tarbiya-yi Atfâl (Education of Children) with the express aim of sending students to Istanbul to receive an education they could not even embark on in Bukhara.[48] Over the years, it succeeded in sending significant numbers of students to the Ottoman empire: 30 in 1910, 15 in 1911, and 30 each in 1913 and 1914, before the outbreak of war put an end to the venture.[49] Students sent to Istanbul could count on the support of the Bukharan Society for the Dissemination of Knowledge (Buhara Ta'mim-i Maarif Cemiyeti), established by Bukharan expatriates in conjunction with reformers in Bukhara.[50]

The school ran into trouble at its first public function, an examination held on 6 September 1909. As was customary for all new-method schools in Turkestan, numerous notables (including mudarrises and functionaries of the government) were invited to attend. Ayni recalls that the ability of the pupils to read the Qur'an impressed those in attendance, and Ikrâm gave a speech in support of the new method. Yet, very quickly, opposition developed among the ulama who petitioned the qushbegi to close the school. After some debate, the school was ordered shut on 13 September.

The Jadids claimed that the animus of the ulama derived from their fear of the inherent superiority of the new-method school, for that would proclaim to the world the ulama's own ignorance. A correspondent for a sympathetic Istanbul journal quoted one of the ulama as exclaiming, 'We saw at the recent examination [of September 1909] how a five-year-old child ... discussed freely matters that even we do not understand completely'.[51] But clearly not all ulama were opposed to new education. There were supporters of the new-method school among them, and none had opposed the russo-native school. Indeed, many madrasa students were in favour of the new method of education, and according to a Russian police report, a number of them appeared before the qushbegi in 1913 with a request that they be sent to Istanbul for further education.[52] Rather, the schools fell prey to the politics of the ulama, which had little to do with new-method education.

In 1908, the longtime qâzi kalân Badriddin died. The qushbegi, Âstânaqul, a Shi'i, was instrumental in appointing Baqâ Khoja as the new qâzi kalân, passing over Badriddin's son Burhâniddin, who was ra'is. Burhâniddin therefore set about undermining Astânaqul's position, with the aim of becoming qâzi kalân himself. The ulama, in Ayni's words, 'just having found freedom from the despotism of qâzi Badriddin, were, like a newly broken-in steed, prepared for all kinds of pointless effort'.[53] More than that, the loss of the position of qâzi kalân was a blow to the Kulâbi faction, which mobilized around Burhâniddin. But the latter had other allies as well: Mullâ Qamar Noghây, a Tatar who had lived and taught in Bukhara for three decades; Ghiyâs Makhdum, the a'lam and a popular mudarris; and Râziq, with his large following among students from Ferghâna. In the new method school, they found an issue with which to pressure the qushbegi. Âstânaqul was favourably disposed toward the school, as were Mufti Ikrâm and Sharifjân Makhdum, leading figures among the Bukhâri faction. If the new method was a *bid'at* (innovation), then the Shi'i qushbegi's support of it could be used to show him in a damaging light.

Râziq therefore approached the qushbegi with a petition to have the school closed. Heated debates ensued, in which Ikrâm and one other mufti supported the new school, while most other dignitaries opposed it. Both sides produced

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appropriate fatwas. Astanaqul forwarded both fatwas to Baqâ Khoja for his opinion. According to Ayni, Baqâ Khoja examined the new-method school's pupils and found nothing contrary to the shariat in their education. But opponents of the school openly threatened sedition, leading the qushbegi to close the school.[54] Presented as a bid'at, the new-method school aroused passions of indignation, and Burhaniddin and his faction were able to force the qushbegi's hand.

The Tatar school remained in existence, however, and many pupils from the Bukharan school transferred to it. Indeed in early 1910, the government granted a request by the Tatars for more spacious premises for the school, which moved from the house of Khalid Burnashev to a house near the Gâukushân madrasa.[55] The move, however, made the school more conspicuous and provided further fuel to Burhâniddin and his allies, who first forced the amir to order the expulsion of the Bukharan pupils from the school and, at the end of 1910, its closure altogether. Parents of the affected children arranged for the continuation of their education in small groups by private tutors.[56] New-method education had suffered a setback, to be sure, but the real struggle was between the Kulâbis and the qushbegi, not between the ulama (as a whole) and the new method of education.

Burhâniddin's campaign against the qushbegi continued after the closure of the new-method schools. Another opportunity arrived in January 1910 when Bukhara exploded in murderous riots between the city's Sunni and Shi'i populations. Trouble began on 9 January, the day of 'Âshura (the annual Shi'i rite of mourning), when several madrasa students interfered with Shi'i processions and were attacked. One student, from Ferghana, was killed. Within the hour, news spread throughout the town that the Shi'is were killing madrasa students and rioting began. Over the next five days, several hundred people on both sides died, as the qushbegi waffled and became paralysed. The amir was in Karmina and refused to return to the city. Order was restored only when Âlimkhân, the heir apparent, entered the city with several hundred Russian troops behind him. The Russians proceeded to occupy the city—something that had never happened even in the darkest days under Muzaffar—where life returned very quickly to normal.

Relations between the two communities had been peaceful for decades and the riots were therefore quite unexpected. They are usually explained by the Sunni ulama's resentment at the rising Shi'i influence at court. But the immediate causes were quite different. Ayni and Fitrat, both admittedly writing after the revolution, assert that the riots were manipulated by Râziq (the first victim was a student from Ferghana and thus part of Râziq's following) and Ghiyâs Makhdum as part of their campaign against Astânaqul. Not only did the two inflame opinion among the madrasa students, they also managed to lay the blame for the riots on Astânaqul once order was restored.[57] To a certain extent they succeeded: Âstânaqul was deposed under Russian pressure and replaced by Nasrullah Bek Parvânachi, the hâkim of Shahr-i Sabz. But his removal was balanced by the removal also of Burhâniddin, whom the Russians held partly

responsible for the riots. He was appointed qazi of Karmina and thus removed from the capital. Worse was to come: not only Baqâ Khoja remained qâzi kalân, but the new qushbegi was equally hostile to the Kulâbis. By May 1910, Ghiyâs was openly suggesting that Âstânaqul's ouster had been improper and that the ulama should petition the amir to reinstate him.[58]

Abdulahad died in December 1910 and was succeeded by his son Âlimkhân. The new amir came to the throne when talk of outright annexation had picked up in Russia. His ascent to the throne therefore allowed hope that reform might be in the offing. Âlimkhân began with announcing his intention to reform madrasas and the military, to regularize revenue collection and to abolish the custom of receiving gifts from newly appointed functionaries.[59] With Nasrullah Bek and Baqâ Khoja firmly in place, the Kulâbis' influence was in check, although both Ghiyâs and Râziq remained in Bukhara as vocal opponents of change. Over the next three and a half years, the struggles of the ulama continued and became intertwined with the efforts of the reformers to benefit from the sympathies of the new amir and his top functionaries.

The first years of Âlimkhân's reign were quite propitious for the reformers. The Tatar school to allowed to reopen in 1911. The following year, a group of reformers was able to secure permission to publish a newspaper in Kâgân. Activists invited a certain Mirzâ Jalâl Yusufzâda from Transcaucasia to be the editor. The newspaper, *Bukhârâ-yi sharîf* was in Persian and first appeared on 11 March 1912. Later in the year, it began a Turkic supplement, called *Turân*, which appeared twice a week. Initially, the official publisher was a Russian printer in Kâgân, but soon the Bukhara Company, fortified by 9000 rubles raised through 15-ruble shares, took on the responsibility.[60] On the first day of publication, the editor took care to present copies of the first issue to the qushbegi, who expressed his pleasure 'that the newspaper will inform people of the news of the world', and invited the editor to his table.[61] The newspapers seem to have done well enough financially—they carried far more advertising than any other Central Asian newspaper of the period—and their content remained politically cautious.

In October 1912, Usmân Khoja, recently returned from an extended stay in Istanbul, opened a full-fledged new-method school in Bukhara. The reform movement, it seemed, was finally getting a foothold in Bukharan society. The spring of 1914 was perhaps its high point in Bukhara: Usmân Khoja, Mukammiliddin Burhân and Hâmid Khoja Mehri all ran new-method schools, with a total enrollment of around 170. In addition, two new-method schools were operated by the Shi'i community and funded by waqf income. Finally, another school, run by a certain Mullâ Wafâ, was primarily devoted to teaching Russian to students of all ages. In addition, schools appeared in Karki, Shahr-i Sabz, Qarâkul and Ghijduvân.[62] These schools existed in a legal limbo, for no permission to open them had been sought or granted, but they were not secret either. There was even talk of reform in the madrasas. In 1911, a group of madrasa students had petitioned the amir to decree a reform of the curriculum, and the abolition of the *iftitâhâna*. The amir obliged them, much to the

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consternation of the majority of the ulama.[63] The decree remained a dead letter, but in 1914, Dâmlâ Najmuddin, the mudarris at Abdullah Khan madrasa, announced his intention to stop using some of the glosses commonly used in Bukharan madrasas and begin lecturing on tafsir and hadith.[64]

But hostilities between the two factions had proceeded apace even in the absence of Burhâniddin from the capital. In March 1910 a Russian inspector arrived to investigate conditions in Bukhara in the aftermath of the Russian intervention. He held a public meeting with several high ranking ulama in Kokaltâsh madrasa, in which he asked their opinion about the permissibility of the new-method, the sale of madrasa cells and levels of agricultural taxation in Bukhara. Ghiyâs Makhdum asked for time so that the ulama could come to a unanimous opinion. In the ensuing debates, Ikrâm was again the odd man out. For his pains, he was confronted by twelve of his colleagues who forced him at gun point to sign a document decreeing new-method schools to be *harâm* and to promise not to oppose his peers again. Ikrâm complained to the qushbegi the following day and threatened to resign as mufti. He was mollified, but the majority opinion was not changed.[65] In 1912, he took his challenge to his peers one step further and put it in print. His book, *Iqâz un-nâ'imin wa a'lâm ul-jâhilin* ('Awakening the Sleepers and Informing the Ignorant'), documented his assertions about the impermissibility of numerous Bukharan customs, although support for new-method schools did not appear in it.[66] Bukharan debates usually did not enter print and this innovation did not add to Ikrâm's popularity. The ulama, led by Râziq and Mullâ Qamar Noghây, launched a petition campaign against him, accusing him of heresy and collusion with the Russians. Fearing agitation, Âlimkhân appointed Ikrâm qâzi of the distant Zindani tuman and thus removed him from the capital.[67]

At the end of the following year, however, he was back. Râziq and Ghiyâs overplayed their hand and lost their position. In August 1911, the Political Agency, tired of Ghiyâs Makhdum's obstreperousness (he had opposed vocally the opening of old Bukhara's first cinema and the paving of some of the roads in the city, both projects dear to the Agency), had forced the amir to send him on hajj. The Russians had also long been wary of Râziq, whose house they had searched for weapons in the aftermath of the riots of 1910.[68] With their blessings, the amir also attempted to exile Râziq to a job in the provinces, but his supporters among the students rioted on 10 August 1911 and the following two days, forcing the amir to rescind his order.[69] Two years later, however, the amir managed to convince Râziq to follow Ghiyâs on the hajj, clearing the way for Ikrâm's return to the capital in December 1913 as mufti,[70] an event that was celebrated by fellow reformers in Central Asia and beyond.[71] In his moment of triumph, Ikrâm used support for new-method schools to assert his presence in the capital. His house immediately became a meeting place for merchants, Tatars, and other supporters of reform. In late December 1913, he was reported to be urging wealthy merchants to donate funds for opening a large-scale new-method school. In January 1914, Ikrâm interceded with the amir and obtained permission to open a new-method school for as many as 800 students. His success did not

last long, however. He was strongly censured when he presented this proposal to a meeting (*gap*) of notable ulama on 25 January 1914. Only Baqâ Khoja, the qâzi kalân, supported him. Ikrâm was adamant, but the opposition of the vast majority of the ulama prevented the realization of this project.[72]

At the same time, however, Burhâniddin was working his way back into the amir's favour. He had been on close terms with Âlimkhân when the latter was governor of Karmina. He used these connections first to get himself appointed qâzi of Chârjuy. Then, in early 1914, he hosted a marathon feast for the amir, and as a result, finally attained the office of qâzi kalân.[73] His return to the capital, with the amir's full blessings, marked the victory of the Kulâbi faction and the eclipse of Ikrâm and his allies. Over the following years, Burhâniddin consolidated his power by appointing his allies and students to posts throughout the country. For the reformers, his success meant the instant demise of the schools. The axe fell suddenly at the end of June. After prayers on Friday 29 June, the amir was presented with a petition asking for the closure of the new-method schools which had been declared harâm in his father's time. The amir passed the matter along to the qushbegi, who, loathe to take on the dominant faction of the ulama, gave it over to the new qâzi kalân, with predictable results. The schools were shut down on 5 July.[74]

This was a big blow, but not the end of the reform movement. It only pushed the schools underground, as students began to meet teachers in private homes. A Russian police informant claimed that by September, the total number of such underground schools had risen to 45.[75] In addition, the hâkim of Shahr-i Sabz ignored Burhâniddin's fatwa and the school there continued to function.[76] (We do not know the fate of other provincial schools.)

The fluctuating fortunes of new-method schools in Bukhara are best explained by the dynamics of ulama politics in which the schools became a surrogate of other, deeper, and more meaningful conflicts. The fact that the russo-native school never attracted any attention is evidence that opposition to the schools was not total, but rather rooted in the politics of the capital. The real struggles were between the two factions of ulama, and between the Kulâbis and the qushbegi. These struggles were about power, prestige, wealth and influence, and were fought with greater resources than available to other groups in society. The merchants who pioneered new-method education were no match to the ulama in this regard: some of them might command considerable wealth, but they were short on cultural capital. They remained marginal to Bukharan politics. Their alliance with reformist ulama was of utmost importance to them, but their allies were outflanked by Burhâniddin and his faction.

The politics of reform

The reformers entered the fray quite ill-prepared, but they enjoyed access to the printed word, which played an indispensable role in their strategies from

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the very beginning. Through print, they could take their aspirations and their demands to a much greater audience beyond the confines of Bukhara. The audience they found was sympathetic and the impression they garnered in that public was that of a group much more numerous and influential than they in fact were. Gasprinskii had long been interested in Bukharan affairs and published numerous articles in his *Terjüman* even before there was a substantial reformist constituency in Bukhara. Once reformist activity began, the Jadids put their case to the Muslim press of both the Russian and the Ottoman empires. In 1909, in the immediate aftermath of the first closing of new-method schools, anonymous articles appeared in the Orenburg newspaper *Vaqït* decrying the actions of the ulama.[77] Bukharan émigrés in Istanbul had a conspicuous presence in 'Islamist' periodicals such as *Sırat-ı Müstakim* and *Tearif-i Müslimin*, and the Jadid press in Turkestan and the rest of the Russian empire continued to support the reformist cause in Bukhara down to 1917.

The desiderata of reform were most clearly expressed in the fictional *Tales of an Indian Traveller* by Abdurrauf Fitrat, the most influential writer among Bukharan Jadids. Fitrat used the voice of an Indian Muslim with modern sensibilities to criticize the existing order in Bukhara. From the moment he sets foot in Bukhara, the Traveller sees only disorder, chaos, and filth. The fundamental reason is lack of education, which produces ignorance of the rest of the world and its achievements, but also of the dangers that lurk there for the future of Bukhara. Bukharan masters, for instance, make very fine fabric, but they have no foresight and do not know what will happen to their trade in a decade. The same ignorance leads to the corruption of Islam itself through practices such as saint worship and pederasty. The ulama come in for bitter criticism: confronted with their practice of charging fees for affixing their seals, the Traveller exclaims, 'The shariat is for sale in Bukhara!' The solution lies with the government. The remedies suggested by the Traveller all revolve around the government: the creation of an economic policy, the establishment of a network of schools, capped by colleges, including one devoted to medicine, the establishment of public health and curbing the corrupt practices of the ulama.[78]

The reformers invested great hopes in the amir, who they hoped would do his duty as a Muslim sovereign to reform the country. They addressed their pleas to him and praised every move on his part that was even dimly reformist. Fitrat first appeared in print in 1910 with an open letter to the Nasrullah Bek Parvânachi, the newly appointed qushbegi of Bukhara, urging him to implement the reforms promised by the new amir upon his ascension to the throne. '[Islam and shariat] constantly look to you with expectant eyes; they expect aid and assistance from you. ... The hope for life of this oppressed Muslim community [*ummat-i mazluma-yi Islâmi*] depends on your effort.'[79] The following year, he concluded his *Debate between a Bukharan Mudarris and a European*, the most widely read reformist tract in all of Central Asia, with a similar plea to the amir, 'the kind father of all Bukharans, king-protector of the nation' (*'âlî hazrat padar-i mehrbân-i bukhârâyiyân, padshâh-i millatpanâh*), to act in defence of Islam and Bukhara before it was too late.[80] Upon his return to Bukhara, Fitrat continued to praise, at least in public, every slight movement of the Bukharan government toward change.[81] Sympathizers elsewhere were similarly caught between praise and exhortation of the amir.

The centrality of the state gave Bukharan Jadidism a distinct flavour, quite different from Jadidism elsewhere in the Russian empire, where it was very much a movement of cultural reform in society, faced with a colonial state that was indifferent, if not hostile, to reform. Bukhara's residual sovereignty made it comparable, for Bukharans as well as other contemporary Muslims, not to Muslim communities in colonial situations such as those of Turkestan or India, but to the Ottoman empire. This also explains the choice of Istanbul, rather than Kazan or St. Petersburg, for sending students. There had long been a Bukharan presence in Istanbul, with a Naqshbandi lodge in Üsküdar providing a centre for the community. These were tumultuous times in the Ottoman capital and Bukharan students were thrown in the middle of the intellectual ferment of the time. It is not easy to trace their activities there, but it seems safe to say that most of them had strong affinities for the anti-imperialist Muslim modernism espoused by Islamist journals such as *Sıratı Müstakim* and *Tearifi Müslimin*. Nur Alizade Ghiyâsiddin Husni, who studied at the Darülmüallimin (the recently established teachers' college), wrote extensively for both these periodicals. Fitrat, sent to Bukhara in 1910, was close to Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, a leading Islamist and publisher of the newspaper *Hikmet*.

Following Ottoman patterns, the Jadids also appropriated the rhetoric of the 'nation' (*millat*), which played a crucial role in their reformist project. The protectorate had defined the boundaries of Bukhara and made it increasingly a *territorial* state. The nation and the state came to be the yardstick by which the worth of political deeds was to be measured. The amir might be celebrated as the 'the kind father of all Bukharans, king-protector of the nation', but the nation now had its own claims on the amir. Indeed, the dissonance between what the Jadids of Bukhara saw as the amir's duty and what the amir actually did led them to organize in secret societies. Although the ability of secret societies to act on matters of public interest was greatly circumscribed, the fact that such reform had to be articulated through them led to the politicization of the movement and allowed the movement a stronger institutional basis than anywhere else in the Russian empire. But as the Jadids of Bukhara discovered in 1917, such organization was no alternative to political experience. If anything, secret societies tended to isolate the reformers from the rest of the population.

Moreover, the assimilation the discourses of the nation and progress meant the reformers had come a long way from the intellectual world of the ulama. This was essentially a different conception of reform than that espoused by reformist ulama such as Ikrâm and Sharifjân Makhdum. The hot house atmosphere of the period kept these differences submerged, but they were to surface in 1917 and beyond, when the young intellectuals went far in their radicalism for the sake of the nation and its progress.

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The amirs and the Russians

The primary concern of the amirs was, of course, the maintenance of their own power. This involved keeping domestic challenges to their authority, whether they emanated from the ulama or the Jadids, in check, while holding the Russians at bay. There was some pressure in Russia at this time to end the protected status of Bukhara (and Khiva) and to proceed with outright annexation. The amirs could ignore this only at their own peril. These imperatives defined the responses of the amirs to domestic politics.

The amirs had little intention of bringing about the wholesale reform the Jadids advocated. It would have upset the *status quo* too jarringly and gone against their carefully cultivated rhetoric of traditionalism. Neither Abdulahad, nor Âlimkhân were personally inimical to the new schools, but neither one of them felt that they constituted a cause worth taking the ulama on. (The same was true of other personages such as Badriddin, the qâzi kalân whose death in 1908 set off the struggle of the ulama, Astanaqul qushbegi, and Nasrullah Bey Parvânachi, his successor, who were all sympathetic to the schools, but unwilling to risk trouble for their sake.) As Abdulahad told the Political Agent in the immediate aftermath of the closing of the first Bukharan school in 1909, 'At present the students and teachers are in complete agreement and the permission to open the projected school is bound to cause unrest among them. In a few months' time, when passions have quieted down, it will be possible to permit the opening of the school.'[82] At other times, he could be quite glib. In 1914, in a conversation with Mahmud Khoja Behbudi, the Samarqand Jadid, Gasprinskii recalled meeting Abdulahad at his summer palace in Yalta after new-method schools had been closed down in Bukhara in 1910. 'We had a long talk', Gasprinskii told Behbudi. 'I told him of my anguish at the sorry fate of Bukharan schools. [The amir] said, "This is a new epoch, not the old one. The consultative principle operates in every school. In our Bukhara too, the ulama consulted together and expressed their opinion against the existence of these new schools. Therefore, the school was closed." Alas, Khoja Mufti efendi!', Gasprinskii was left to exclaim, 'Our Muslim rulers even become constitutionalists in order to keep the nation and Islam from progress.'[83]

At the same time, the amirs had to pay at least lip service to Russian concerns about good governance. The first decade of the 20th century saw considerable talk in Russia of annexation. Most of it came from outside the ruling circles, but could not simply be shrugged off.[84] The riots of 1910 provided ample fuel for the critics of the protectorate. Abdulahad did nothing beyond removing the qushbegi and the ra'is from office, but when Âlimkhân succeeded to the throne the following year, he was well aware of the need to mollify this sentiment. The accession manifesto he proclaimed (but did not put into print) was aimed at this audience, not the fledgling domestic reformers, even though the latter received it very well. Most of these promises remained on paper, but the first years of Âlimkhân's reign were the high point of Jadid success. By 1914, however, debate over the status of Bukhara had died out in Russia (and with the outbreak

of war that year, completely forgotten), and the return of Burhaniddin to the capital having strengthened the conservative ulama's hand, Âlimkhân capitulated and ordered the new method schools shut down. The ulama, with their resources and their ability to mobilize support, were the real issue for him. Yet, Âlimkhân stopped short of rooting out all reformist activity. Schools continued to function in secret (and in the provinces) and the Jadids were also able to continue their activities in the book trade. In 1915, they formed the Barakat (Abundance) Company with an initial operating capital of 30,000 rubles raised through the sale of 15-ruble shares.[85] The main operation of the company was the Ma'rifat (Knowledge) bookshop, which in addition to selling books and newspapers, also published several works of Fitrat. The shop also became the meeting place of the Jadids.[86]

The Russian authorities had their own assessment of the situation. Ayni's characterization of the Political Agency and its functionaries, especially the dragoman N. Shul'ga, as deceitful agents of reaction,[87] is not entirely fair, being a product of the time in which he wrote, and coloured perhaps by events of 1917. The picture of Russian perceptions of Bukharan developments, as it emerges from archival evidence, is much more ambivalent. Russian officials dealing with Bukhara were torn between a dilemma of their own making. Russian policy continued to see in the stability of the amirs' rule the best antidote to the 'native fanaticism' they so feared. Yet, the amirs sought stability through an appeal to the very traditionalism that was supposed to produce 'fanaticism'. This was a constant source of dissatisfaction with the policies of the amirs, as was the 'disorder' and 'corruption' reigning in the emirate—the very things criticized by the Jadids. All the same, the appearance of an indigenous reform movement provoked very ambivalent reactions. For many Russian officials, modernist movements among the empire's Muslims were twice as dangerous, for they combined the plain old fashioned fanaticism with modern means of communication and organization. For others, however, the enlightenment aspect of Jadidism represented an improvement over the 'fanaticism' of traditional Muslim culture. Such administrators were willing to accept these aspects of Jadidism provided they could neutralize the 'political' content of the education and ensure its harmlessness to empire. For neither side did the commitment to enlightenment override the political exigencies of empire, but the differences were more than cosmetic.

N. A. Shul'ga, the much maligned dragoman at the Political Agency, belonged to the latter group. In the spring of 1914, Shul'ga visited all the new-method schools of the city, and found much to praise in them. Of Usmân Khoja's school, the most substantial of the four, he wrote: 'In general the school produces a propitious, and in comparison with the usual Bukharan maktab, a magnificent impression'.[88] His report included detailed descriptions of the schools, with more than a tinge of admiration for the educational goals of the new-method schools. For Shul'ga, the demand for new-method schools came from solid merchants of the city for purely pragmatic reasons. This need was 'undeniable', he argued in a 1911 memorandum, and if opportunities for it were closed in Bukhara, the

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merchants would send their sons to Istanbul and thus expose them to Ottoman influence and pan-Islamic ideas harmful to Russian interests. New-method schools in Bukhara were not harmful to Russian interests in themselves, Shul'ga argued, and supervision rather than proscription would suit Russian interests best. The solution was to encourage the establishment of new-method schools but to bring such schools under the supervision of the Political Agency.[89] 'More appropriate would be the establishment on a more or less broad basis by the emir, of schools providing general education, which, being new-method institutions, would subsume under them the currently existing half-secret new-method schools, and with the help of an appropriate group of teachers from Muslims who are Russian subjects, be in a position to keep an eye on the intentions of Bukharan liberals.'[90] He did not, however, hold out much hope of this actually coming about, for the emir was unlikely to risk the massive opposition the ulama were likely to present to such an in initiative. The security of Âlimkhân's power remained the paramount consideration, however, and when Burhâniddin's petition led to the closure of the schools in June 1914, the Political Agency did not protest.

So much for the schools. The Political Agency's attitude toward the other demands of the Jadids remained suspicious. With their Ottoman connections, they were, almost by definition 'pan-Islamists' and hence disloyal. No matter how similar the Jadids' position on administrative reform was to that of the Russians, the latter could not overcome their suspicion. The habits of autocracy, with its aversion to participation by any public group, were too engrained to be overcome, least of all on this distant colonial frontier. The suspicions bred in this period were to poison the relationship between the Political Agency and the Jadids in 1917.

If the Political Agency was wary of the intentions of Bukharan liberals, it was not enamoured of the antics of the conservative ulama and their supporters, either. Râziq and Ghiyâs were forced out in 1911 on its initiative for having 'inordinate influence' in Bukhara, and the Agency continued to be suspicious of the ability of madrasa students to cause trouble in the streets. After 1910, it also sought to extend its control over students from Turkestan (who were Russian subjects) who came to study in Bukhara. To this end, a Russian police official was stationed in the old city of Bukhara, thus further strengthening Russian control over Bukhara.[91] On this occasion, Âlimkhân was happy to comply. In August 1911, soon after the students had rioted in support of Râziq, Âlimkhân expressed the wish that students not be allowed to come to Bukhara from Ferghana, for they were 'the most dangerous and unruly element' in the city and the strongest pillar of support for Râziq.[92] Little effective control was achieved, however, and the head of Russian police in Bukhara was writing in October 1916 that 'the question of regularizing supervision over Russian-subject madrasa students in Old Bukhara remains open to this day'.[93] With the outbreak of war, suspicions of pan-Islamic activity overshadowed everything else. The Jadids, with their Ottoman connections, were all suspect, but they kept a low profile and survived without harm. Ayni was denounced once in a typically implausible

secret police report for being part of a 'germanophile circle'.[94] He was summoned to the qushbegi's offices, but let off with an admonition to be careful.[95]

The disaster of 1917

The February revolution in Russia redefined the political terrain in Bukhara as much as it did anywhere else in the empire. To Bukharan reformers it brought the hope that the new liberal democratic regime in Russia would force the amir to promulgate reforms. The Jadids of Bukhara immediately swung into action. They formed what Ayni described as a 'semi-secret' society which began meeting in the house of Fayzullah Khojaev.[96] This society sent two of its members to Samarqand to send the following telegram to the Provisional Government: 'Great Russia, through its devoted sons, has irretrievably overthrown the old despotic regime, and founded in its place a free, democratic government. We humbly ask that the new Russian government in the near future instruct our government to change the manner of its governance to the bases of freedom and equality, so that we may [also] take pride in the fact that we are under the protection of Great Free Russia.'[97] In mobilizing external support, the Jadids were relying on their main strength, for their support within Bukhara was still problematic. The Provisional Government was well disposed toward reform, but A. Ia. Miller, the Russian Resident (as the Political Agent now came to be called), was convinced of the need for the reform to emanate from the amir himself and to accord with 'the shariat', for otherwise it would provoke the hostility of the ulama, which in turn may lead to conflagration across the region that might invite intervention from Afghanistan.[98] Officialdom's fears of fanaticism and pan-Islam had survived the revolution intact.

For his part, the amir acted carefully. He sought, above all, to minimize the impact of the revolution on his realm. He was not entirely averse to reform, however, and made some effort in that direction, even though several important ulama opposed the reforms. These included the qâzi kalân, Burhâniddin, the ra'is, Izâmiddin Musannif and Nizâmiddin Urganji, who sent the amir numerous petitions asking him to desist. The amir did not respond and when the opponents of reform persisted, he removed them from the capital by giving them new positions in the provinces. Nizâmiddin was sent off to Qarshi and Izâmiddin was made qazi of Ghijduvân. They were replaced by ulama disposed to reform. Sharifjân Makhdum became the new qâzi kalân and Abdussamad Khoja the new ra'is. Over the month of March, Âlimkhân worked out a draft of a manifesto with the Residency. After it was approved by St Petersburg, Âlimkhân proclaimed it on 7 April at an august ceremony attended by Bukharan dignitaries, representatives of the Residency and of the Kâgân Soviet, several representatives of the Samarqand Executive Committee (including Mahmud Khoja Behbudi, the most respected Jadid of Turkestan) and even 'five or six children [*bachcha*]',[99] as the qushbegi's invitation put it in referring to the Bukharan Jadids. The manifesto promised supervision over functionaries, the suppression of unjust taxes, and the establishment of a state exchequer and a budget. It also proclaimed

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the creation of an elected council in the city of Bukhara to oversee matters of public health and sanitation. Finally, the manifesto expressed Âlimkhân's intention of 'taking all measures to disseminate education and the sciences ... in strict accordance with the shariat'. To this end, the amir was to establish Bukhara's first printing press.[100]

The proclamation created differences among the Jadids. Some were glad to accept it as a beginning, while others wanted to seize the opportunity to demand much more. The more impatient Jadids, Fayzullah Khojaev and Fitrat among them, decided to organize a demonstration the next day to thank the amir for granting new liberties to his people. The demonstration went ahead in spite of misgivings on the part of many Jadids and included in prominent places members of the Shi'i and Jewish communities. The Jadids were met with a much larger counter-demonstration and although the Jadids avoided a confrontation by dispersing quickly. The government pursued them, arresting approximately thirty Jadids in the next few hours. Ayni, who had not taken part in the demonstration, was arrested anyway and imprisoned in the notorious dungeon in the palace. He was ultimately given 75 lashes of the whip. He recuperated in Kâgân after he was released and then left Bukhara for Samarqand, never to return permanently. Other Jadids fled to Kâgân, where the moderates sought the intercession of the Residency in negotiating an amnesty for themselves and an end to the persecution of other Jadids. The amir granted them an audience on 14 April, but the occasion turned into a nightmare. The ulama in the audience were in no mood for compromise and the amir left the room in the middle. Meanwhile, a crowd had gathered outside the Ark, seeking the Jadids' head. The Cossack escort of the Residency held them off until reinforcements could arrive from Kâgân and extricate the Jadids and Miller from their predicament. Among the casualties was Abdussamad Khoja, the reformist ra'is, who was beaten up by the crowd.[101]

Âlimkhân, having burned the bridges, proceeded to appoint conservatives to high ranking positions and ignore the revolution raging beyond his domain. Not only were Sharifjân Makhdum and Abdussamad Khoja, the recent appointees, removed, but so was Nasrullah Parvânachi, the qushbegi since 1910. He was replaced by Nizâmuddin Urganji, while Burhâniddin again became qâzi kalân. These two headed a resurgence of conservative ulama. On 6 May, Khâlmurâd Tâshkandi, a long time ally of Burhâniddin, published a fatwa declaring all Jadids, in Bukhara as well as elsewhere, to be 'enemies of the faith' and declaring it incumbent upon all faithful Muslims to persecute them. The fatwa had the support of most ulama in the city and when Ikrâm demurred, his agreement was obtained at gunpoint.[102] Serious disagreements had erupted between the Jadids and the ulama in Turkestan as well, and Bukhara came to be the centre of anti-Jadid sentiment all over Central Asia. But the local dynamic was important. The ulama extended their assertion of power to the amir himself. Âlimkhân decided in May to escape from the crisis to his summer mansion in Yalta, but was dissuaded from doing so by the Residency, which suggested he take his vacation in Karmina instead. At this point, a delegation of ulama approached him and demanded that he postpone his visit. The Residency was left

to decry this impropriety, and complain to the qushbegi of 'the inadmissibility of such declarations of the clergy ... with regard to the amir' which 'disparaged the authority of the government ... and [which are] no less dangerous sowers of agitation among the population than the most extreme Young Bukharans'.[103] Rue as he might, he could do little about the fact that antireform ulama were in the ascendency in the city and the proponents of reform among the ulama had been defeated. The manifesto remained a dead letter, but the amir spent the rest of the year building up his army.

The fiasco of 14 April also spelled the end of Miller's tenure, who was placed under house arrest by the Kâgân Soviet. Miller was replaced by an interim successor. This marked the end of any significant Russian presence in Bukhara (it was not to re-established until 1920). By the time a new resident was appointed in September, the amir was demanding the indefinite postponement of the reforms promised in his manifesto and the Soviet in Kâgân was usurping more and more of the Residency's power.

The April events were a major turning point in Jadid attitudes in Bukhara. Most of the activists went into exile or were pushed underground. Many figures, such as Ayni and Fitrat, went to Turkestan, while others remained in Kâgân, where they formed an organization (called Shurâ-yi Islâm, the generic name used by all Jadid organizations in Turkestan in 1917) led by Muhiddin Mansurov, Fayzullah Khojaev and Ahmadjân Makhdum.[104] In short order, this organization sent three representatives to the All-Russian Muslim conference held in Moscow in May.[105] Some took up Russian citizenship as an extra level of insurance.[106] But the most significant result of the April events was a profound radicalization, as the realization that reform could not be expected from the amir sunk in. The desperation of their situation brought them closer to the Soviets, which at the time represented the hopes of radical change in all spheres of life. Over the summer and autumn of 1917, the Bukharan Jadids began referring to themselves as Young Bukharans (*Mlado-bukhartsy*, *Yâsh Bukhârâlilar*), the name that Russians had long used to describe all reformers in Bukhara. The process of their radicalization had begun; they were to travel an immense distance over the next three years in their political odyssey.

The path to revolution

In October, when the Tashkent soviet took power in Turkestan, the Young Bukharans had little choice but to look to it for help against the amir, even though the Tashkent regime then was little more than a settler oligarchy which aggressively excluded all Muslims from power. Tashkent had its own military imperatives, however, which impelled it to act against Bukhara. In February 1918, troops from Tashkent crushed the rival autonomous government established by Jadids and moderate Russians in Kokand, and in the hubris of the moment, the Tashkent soviet contemplated military action against Bukhara. In March, the chairman of the Tashkent government, F. I. Kolesov, showed up in Kâgân and announced to the Young Bukharans that he will invade Bukhara in

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five days. On 4 March (o. s.), a hastily formed revolutionary committee of Young Bukharans formulated an ultimatum that Kolesov was to deliver to the amir. For all its daring (the amir was given 24 hours to agree to its terms, under threat of invasion), the ultimatum is remarkable for the modesty of its political aims: 'Bukhara should have the constitutional form of government, and a national assembly [*milli majlis*] should be formed, with authority over the appointments and dismissals of all qâzis and functionaries other than the amir, and over the treasury and the armed forces. Until the assembly convenes, such authority should be exercised by the Young Bukharans. The amir will be retained as a constitutional monarch, answerable to the national assembly.'[107] After months of social upheaval and political radicalism throughout the Russian empire, the Young Bukharans were still aiming for constitutional monarchy. As it happened, Kolesov's military adventure ended in disaster. Âlimkhân played for time; after some hesitation, he promised to disarm his troops and invited a delegation to supervise the disarmament. The 25-member delegation was massacred at night, while reinforcements destroyed railway and telegraph links to Turkestan. Kolesov's troops shelled Bukhara, unsuccessfully, until their ammunition gave out and then retreated in much disarray. On 18 March, Kolesov sued for peace, which was signed on 25 March at Qizil Tepe. Although the treaty favoured the Soviet regime, it nevertheless spelled the end, for the time being, of active Soviet threats against the amir.

After the Kolesov misadventure, the amir heightened the persecution of all those he deemed to be reformers, while the treaty allowed him to claim ever greater degrees of independence from Tashkent. Over the next two years, he acted as a sovereign ruler, issuing paper money for the first time, and maintaining diplomatic contact with Afghanistan and the British in Iran and Transcaspia. A mass exodus of Young Bukharans followed. In May 1918, a group of 47 refugees arrived in Tashkent and sought the help of the commissariat of labour in arranging a livelihood. (They were given three Singer sewing machines to allow them to establish a tailors' 'labour commune'.) They labelled themselves, at least in correspondence with Soviet authorities, 'the Revolutionary Party of Young Bukharans (Left Socialist Revolutionaries)', with a central committee of five including Fayzullah Khojaev and Abdulwâhid Munzim.[108] Through the course of the year, the exiles organized politically, often with the help of the Soviet regime (whose aversion to Muslim participation lessened, under pressure from Moscow, after the spring of 1918). Fayzullah Khojaev made his way to Moscow in the autumn of that year, where he organized a Moscow bureau of the Young Bukharan Party and established contact with Party and Soviet authorities.[109] Over the next two years, the Young Bukharans received funds for publication and propaganda from the Central Bureau of Muslim Communist Organizations.[110] In common with the Jadids of Turkestan, who had also been radicalized by the revolution and who, in 1918 and 1919, entered the Communist Party of Turkestan in large numbers and, for a brief period, took it over, the Young Bukharans were enthralled by the political upheaval of the time and the possibilities that it opened up. The Russian revolution for them was an opportunity to modernize the nation and to win national independence, something which they saw as possible only with the help of the Soviet regime, with its anti-bourgeois and anti-imperialist rhetoric, and its own concerns with overcoming backwardness. The tone of Young Bukharan writing in exile exhibits these passions very clearly. Abdullah Badri, who had written several plays before 1917, published two pamphlets in 1919 presenting the Young Bukharans to the peasant population of Bukhara. The amir appears not as the last surviving Muslim monarch in Central Asia, as Bukharan Jadids had seen him before 1917, but as a corrupt, bloodthirsty despot who lives off the toil of the peasants in his realm: 'All his thoughts are of living in luxury, and it is none his business even if the poor and the peasants like us die of starvation. "His highness" is a man concerned only with eating the best *pulow*, wearing robes of the best brocade, drinking good wines, and having a good time with young and good looking boys and girls.'[111] For Fitrat, Âlimkhân had become a 'monument of oppression',[112] who had sold the honour of Bukhara and Islam to the British.[113]

Equally significant was the mere fact that the Young Bukharans were appealing to the peasants and thinking in terms of mobilizing the masses. Up until 1917, Bukharan reformers had been content to propagate reform among the urban elite and see the amir as the agent for uplifting the nation. The amir had now been discredited for letting the nation down and the Jadids turned to the nation itself. But the nation had to be enlightened and uplifted—in a word, it had to be modernized through revolution. The Young Bukharans were fascinated by the possibilities opened up by the revolution for ameliorating the condition of their nation.

In the end, though, the alliance between the Young Bukharans and the Bolsheviks was pragmatic and unequal. As early as the autumn of 1918, the Bolsheviks sponsored the creation of a Bukharan Communist Party (BCP) as a counterweight to the Young Bukharans. Its early history is murky, but it included many non-Bukharans, mostly Tatar or Turkestani communists.[114] Over the next two years, it engaged the Young Bukharans in ever more bitter polemics. But the Soviets were not inclined to take on the amir of Bukhara militarily until their position in Turkestan was secure. This was the case by the summer of 1920, when under the command of M. F. Frunze, the Red Army had vanquished all opposition in the region. There were enough strategic reasons to subjugate Bukhara and assert full control over Central Asia, but the Soviets wanted to put a politically acceptable face on any military action. In August 1920, Frunze presided over a meeting of the various factions of the Young Bukharans and the BCP and forced them into an alliance, which then provoked peasant uprisings in Chârjuy and other parts of the emirate, and asked for Soviet help in overthrowing the amir. The invasion duly came, and Bukhara was taken on 2 September after three days of street fighting. The amir fled to the mountains of Kulâb, while the Young Bukharans proclaimed a People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara. This was, for them, very much a moment of national liberation. They dominated the first government: Mirzâ Abdulqâdir Muhitdinov was head of state; Fayzullah Khojaev, president of the council of ministers; Usmân Khoja,

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minister of finance; and Mukammiliddin Makhdum, minister of justice. Sharifjân Makhdum, who had been in disgrace in Qarshi, made his way to Bukhara to serve the new government.[115] It is telling that Burhâniddin, the qâzi kalân, was one of the first upholders of the old order to be executed.[116]

The Jadids had succeeded finally in overthrowing the amir by mobilizing support beyond the borders of Bukhara.[117] The Red Army was a much more tangible force than the Muslim public opinion to which the Jadids had appealed a decade earlier, but the principle was the same. Forces of the world outside Bukhara had triumphed. The politics of Bukhara, ever opaque to outsiders, were now of even less consequence and even their memory was consigned to the dustbin of history, as the history of the revolution came to be written in a new conceptual framework that had little place in it for the politics of the ulama, or indeed for the politics of exhortation that the Jadids had indulged in before 1917.

Conclusion

In this account of Bukharan politics, I have sought to place the rise of Jadidism in a broader perspective. A rather different picture of Bukharan politics emerges from this account. The struggle for Bukhara's future, as it was waged in the decade before the revolution, had four main protagonists: the amirs, the ulama, the Russians and the Jadids. Each of these groups had its own interests, which could sometimes overlap and were at all times defined by imperatives and strategies rooted in access to resources of power. The Jadids were the weakest group and the most marginal locally, since they were outsiders in the business of Bukharan politics. The real political issues in Bukhara in those years were the struggles of the various factions of the ulama among themselves and against the amir and his functionaries. To participitants in these struggles, the new-method schools appeared not as a grave threat, but as another stick with which to beat each other up. Early reform efforts were thus buffeted around by forces that had nothing to do with them. It was not simply mindless opposition to all innovation that motivated the ulama; rather, their actions involved very substantial stakes in terms of power, money and status. (With a better understanding of the ulama's stakes, we can also put to rest the cliché that Bukhara under the amirs was a theocracy in which 'Islamic law' reigned supreme.) But most importantly, we can also better understand the dynamics that drove the Jadids. Their marginality produced a certain desperation, while their ability to attract support from outside allowed them to upset the rules of the political game in Bukhara. Ultimately, it was these outside sources that brought them success, but in the end, also overwhelmed them.

Notes and References

1. Sadriddin Ayni, 'Bukhârâ inqilâbining tarikhi', *Uchqun*, No 2, 1922, pp 10–11.
2. Ayni wrote copiously on the history and prehistory of the Bukharan revolution. He formulated his basic account of the reformers' struggles in the winter of 1918–1919 in Persian. In the autumn of 1920, weeks

after the overthrow of the amir, he began serializing a history of the Manghit dynasty for the newspaper *Shu'la-yi inqilâb*, which incorporates a great deal of valuable detail about Bukharan politics of the period of interest to us here. This was later collected as *Tarikhi amirâni Mânghitiyyai Bukhârâ* (Tashkent, 1923). I have used a later, Cyrillic-script text: *Ta"rikhi amironi manghitiyai Bukhoro* (hereafter *TAMB*), in Aynî, *Kulliyot*, Vol 10 (Dushanbe, 1966), pp 5–191. In 1922, at the request of the Bukharan Ministry of Education, he translated his earlier manuscript into Uzbek, and published an abridged version in Uzbek as *Bukhârâ inqilâbi tarikhi uchun materiyallar* (Moscow, 1922). Given the rather un-Soviet tone of this work, it was not republished until 1987, when the full Uzbek manuscript was retranslated into Tajik and published as Sadriddin Aynî, *Ta"rikhi inqilobi Bukhoro*, ed. R. Hoshim (Dushanbe, 1987). I have used this text (referred to below as *TIB*) throughout. For a history of this text, see Reinhard Eisener, 'Bukhara v 1917 godu', *Vostok*, No 5, 1994, 86n.

These works have had an enormous influence on later scholarship, both Soviet and non-Soviet. Already in 1919, A. Samoilovich, an orientalist who had worked in the Political Agency, had used Ayni's manuscript to write the first account of the rise of what had become the revolutionary opposition to the amir: 'Pervoe tainoe obshchestvo mlado-bukhartsev', *Vostok*, No 1, 1922, pp 97–99. In writing his influential history of new-method schools in Bukhara (which were to him synonymous with the reform movement), I.I. Umniakov, 'K istorii novometodnoi shkoly v Bukhare', *Trudy SAGU*, No 16, 1927, pp 81–98, too banked heavily on Ayni and Samoilovich. These three texts form the basis for the narrative of Bukharan Jadidism in Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *Réforme et révolution chez les musulmans de l'Empire russe*, 2nd edn (Paris, 1981), pp 137–143, 157–161.

An alternative to Ayni was provided in 1926 by Fayzullah Khojaev, then president of Uzbekistan, who wrote his own account of the Bukharan revolution (F. Khodzhaev, *K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare* (Moscow, 1926)) in a vocabulary more suited to official historiography than Ayni's. Khojaev had to publish a revised version in 1931, to conform to changing ideological norms; for an excellent exploration of the ideological context of these two texts, see Gero Fedtke, 'Jadids, Young Bukharans, communists and the Bukharan revolution: from an ideological debate in the early Soviet Union', in Anke von Kügelgen, Michael Kemper and Allen J. Frank, eds, *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*, Vol 2 (Berlin, 1998), pp 483–512. Written expressly as a Marxist corrective to Ayni, Khojaev consigns the details of Bukharan politics, which encompass so much of Ayni's work, to oblivion. This account formed the basis of much later Soviet historiography (which was generally kinder to reformers in Bukhara than to their counterparts elsewhere in the Russian empire), as well as those non-Soviet scholars whose sole point of entry into Central Asian history was Russian (e.g. Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924* (Cambridge, MA, 1968)).

The recent account by Stéphane A. Dudoignon, 'La Question scolaire à Boukhara et au Turkestan, du «premier renouveau» à la soviétization (fin du XVIIIe siècle-1937)', *Cahiers du monde russe*, Vol 37, 1996, pp 133–210, is admirably sensitive to the local dimension of Bukharan politics, but since it relies solely on Bukharan sources, it cannot provide the detail that Russian archival sources do.

3. A note about terminology is in order here. Bukharan reformers are generally known in the literature as 'Jadids', even though they almost never used the term themselves. Contemporary Russian observers always called them *Mladobukhartsy*, 'Young Bukharans', on the pattern of the Young Turks, with whom Bukharan reformers had certain superficial similarities. The reformers themselves preferred instead terms such as *taraqqiparvar*, 'proponents of progress', or simply *yâshlârljawânân*, 'the youth', but in 1917, they adopted the term *Yâsh Bukhârâlilar*, 'Young Bukharans', for themselves. The term 'Jadid' was first applied to them in Soviet discourse in the early 1920s in a pejorative sense (see Fedtke, 'Jadids, Young Bukharans', pp 486–487), but has since become established as a neutral term. With some misgivings, I use 'Jadid' and 'reformer' interchangeably, but reserve 'Young Bukharan' only for the period after the February revolution.
4. R.D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine* (Princeton, 1992); idem., 'Central Asia, vi: in the 10th—12th/16th—18th centuries', in *Encyclopædia Iranica*, Vol 5 (Costa Mesa, 1992), pp 176–193.
5. T.K. Beisembiev, 'Unknown dynasty: the rulers of Shahrisabz in the 18th and 19th centuries', *Journal of Central Asia*, Vol 15, No 1, 1992, pp 20–22; Eckart Schiewek, 'À propos des exilés de Boukhara et de Kokand à Shahr-i Sabz', *Cahiers d'Asie centrale*, No 5–6, 1998, pp 181–197.
6. I have developed this argument at greater length in Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley, 1998), pp 28–40.
7. M.A. Abduraimov, *Voprosy feodal'nogo zemlevladeniia i feodal'noi renty v pis'makh Emira Khaidara* (Tashkent, 1961), pp 7–8.
8. *Istoriia Uzbekistana*, Vol 3 (Tashkent, 1993), pp 336–349.
9. *Turkistân vilâyatining gazeti*, 11 April 1877.

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10. Sadriddin Ayni relates this episode at length in his memoirs: Sadriddin Aynî, *Yâddâshthâ*, ed. Sa'îdî Sîrjânî (Tehran, 1984),pp 601–605.
11. Aynî, *TAMB*, p 96.
12. Mîrzâ 'Abd al-'Azim Sâmî, *Ta'rîkh-i salâtîn-i manghitîya (Istoriia mangytskikh gosudarei)*, ed. and trans. A.M. Epifanova (Moscow, 1962), p 68a (text), pp 60–61 (trans.).
13. Ibid., pp 72a—74a (text), pp 67–70 (trans.).
14. A substantial literature exists on the Russian conquest of Central Asia and subsequent relations with the British on one hand, and the khanates on the other. The most accessible summary is in Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, chs 1–4.
15. See my *Politics*, pp 50–61.
16. Ayni, *Yâddâshthâ*, pp 503–504.
17. A. A. Semenov, *Ocherk ustroistva tsentral'nogo administrativnogo upravleniia Bukharskogo khanstva pozdneishego vremeni* (Dushanbe, 1954), p 66.
18. G. Tsviling, 'Bukharskaia smuta', *Sredniaia Azia*, No 2, 1910, p 85.
19. PT. Etherton, *In the Heart of Asia* (London, 1922), p 169. Fayzullah Khojaev, *Bukhara inqilobi tarikhiga materiallar* (Tashkent, 1930), pp 19–20, put the extent of the amir's wealth at 100 million (prewar) rubles.
20. *Turkistân vilâyatining gazeti*, 21 July 1878; 2 March 1879.
21. B.Kh. Ergashev, 'Iz istorii obshchestvenno-politicheskoi zhizni Bukhary nachala XX veka', *Obshchestvennye nauki v Uzbekistane*, No 2, 1992, pp 50–52.
22. Aynî, *TAMB*, p 96.
23. Aynî, *TAMB*, pp 96–100.
24. Semenov, *Ocherk*, pp 60–61.
25. Aynî, *TAMB*, Vol 98, pp 109–115.
26. Semenov, *Ocherk*, p 68.
27. Aynî, *Yâddâshthâ*, pp 161–162.
28. O.A. Sukhareva, *Bukhara XIX–nachala XX v.: Pozdnefeodal'nyi gorod i ego naselenie* (Moscow, 1966), pp 72–73n.
29. The best description of madrasa education in Bukhara is in Aynî, *Yâddâshthâ*, pp 162–179 *et passim*.
30. For all their importance, these factional bonds have seldom been noted by scholars. Aynî took them for granted and scarcely mentions them in his works. Fitrat occasionally made passing mention to them (e.g. 'Bukhârâ ulamâsi', *Hurriyat*, 3 November 1917). See, however, Semenov, *Ocherk*, p 67; Dudoignon, 'La question scolaire', pp 143–146.
31. Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Uzbekistan, Tashkent (henceforth TsGARUz), f. 1, op. 31, d. 792, ll. 18–18ob. According to the Political Agency, there were 250 students from Ferghana in Tursunjân and Mir-i Arab madrasas alone in 1911.
32. As an example of the former, see the 'Anthology of Fools' (*Tazkirayi humaqâ*) compiled by Sharifjân Makhdum *c*. 1905 in the 'anthology of poets' genre, which describes the author's rivals at their most uncomfortable moments; Sadri Ziyo, *Navodiri ziyoiya*, ed. S. Siddiqov (Dushanbe, 1991), pp 52–75.
33. The connection between factional and support for reform is also made by Dudoignon, 'La question scolaire', pp 145–146.
34. Aynî, *TIB*, pp 47–48. Although all contemporaries mention Ikrâm's support for reform, his biography remains little known; Umniakov, 'K istorii', 90n, mentions his travels.
35. TsGARUz, f. 3, op. 1, d. 53, ll. 13, 15.
36. On these schools, see Khalid, *Politics*, pp 157–160.
37. TsGARUz, f. 47, op. 1, d. 386, l. 12.
38. Ibid., 27–27ob.
39. The protracted correspondence about this school is in TsGARUz, f. 3, op. 1, d. 476, ll. 10–11; d. 475, ll. 22, 25, 28.
40. While this episode remains unknown, scholars have often noticed the attempt by Gasprinskii to open a school in 1893. The initiative was unsuccessful, and is usually put down to the intractable opposition of the ulama and the pusillanimity of the amir. His lack of success was however simply the result of the fact that he was clearly an outsider, whose stature in the nascent print-based public space of Muslim Russia did not translate into authority in Bukhara. The best account of Gasprinskii's initiative is provided by Edward J. Lazzerini, 'From Bakhohisarai to Bukhara in 1893: Ismail Bey Gasprinskii's Journey to Central Asia', *Central Asian Survey*, Vol 3, No 4, 1984, pp 77–88.
41. On F. Khojaev, see Majid Hasanov, *Fayzulla Kho'jaev* (Tashkent, 1990).
42. On Munzim, see Sohib Tabarov, *Munzim* (Dushanbe, 1991).
43. Aynî, *Yâddâshthâ*, pp 325–327; Sahobiddin Siddiqov, 'Rûzgoru osori Sadri Ziyo', in Sadri Ziyo, *Navodiri ziyoiya*, pp 3–12.

44. Aynî, *TIB*, p 29.
45. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (henceforth GARF), f. 102, op. 241 (1911), d. 74, ch. 84, l. 30ob.
46. Aynî, *TIB*, pp 29–32.
47. Aynî, *TIB*, p 41.
48. The foregoing is based on Aynî, *TIB*, pp 32–41; see also Tabarov, *Munzim*, pp 34–35.
49. GARF, f. 102, op. 241 (1911), d. 74, ch. 84, l. 34.
50. Aynî, *TIB*, pp 100–101. The statutes of this society were published in Istanbul in Persian; I have not seen the original, but a typescript translation is in GARF, f. 102, op. 241 (1911), d. 74, ch. 84, ll. 22–25. An abridged version is in A. Arsharuni and Kh. Gabidullin, *Ocherki panislamizma i pantiurkizma v Rossii* (Moscow, 1931), p 135.
51. M. S. Buhari, 'Buhara'da Şeriat Namına İrtikâb olunan Cinayat', *Sırat-ı Müstakim*, No 66, p 222. Ayni similarly quotes Ghiyâs Makhdum as saying, 'One of the corruptions of this school is this: if in a gathering, one of the pupils of [this] school reads the Qur'an, and then is followed by, say Mufti Mullâ Fayzi, will not the mufti be ridiculed in front of the people and the pupils?' Mullâ Fayzi, Ayni explains, was 'one of the most illiterate muftis of the time' (Ayni, *TIB*, pp 53–53).
52. TsGARUz, f. 3, op. 1, d. 361, l. 23.
53. Aynî, *TAMB*, p 116
54. Aynî, *TIB*, pp 49–55; see also Troyskili Ahmed Taceddin, 'Zevalli Buhara ... !', *Sırat-ı Müstakim*, 12 November 1909, pp 187–190, for a remarkably accurate depiction of the debates among the ulama.
55. TsGARUz, f. 2, op. 1, d. 278, l. 21.
56. Ibid.
57. Ayni, *TAMB*, pp 117–120; *TIB*, pp 58–67; Fitrat, *Davrai hukmronii amir Olimkhon*, ed. A. Nasriddinov (Dushanbe, 1991; orig. 1930), pp 19–26.
58. 'Buhara Mektubu', *Tearif-i Müslimin*, 22 July 1910, pp 153–154; 'Buhara ahvali', *Sırat-ı Müstakim*, 29 July 1910, p 391.
59. The text of this proclamation is in Aynî, *TIB*, p 86. The enthusiasm the reformers and their sympathizers felt at this point is reflected in the wide coverage given this proclamation: Şerik, 'Buhara'da Yeni Emir', *Tearifi Müslimin*, 13 January 1911, pp 107–109; Nur Alizâde Hüsnî, 'Âlem-i İslâmın Karnı Mesudu', *Sırat-ı Müstakim*, 20 January 1911, pp 362–363; 'Şüun: Buhara', *Sırat-ı Müstakim*, 24 February 1911, p 16.
60. Aynî, *TIB*, pp 106–110; A. Samoilovich, 'Pechat' russkikh musul'man', *Mir Islama* Vol 1, 1912, p 478n.
61. *Bukhârâ-yi sharîf*, 14 March 1912.
62. Aynî, *TIB*, p 112.
63. Aynî, *TIB*, pp 103–104.
64. *Âyina*, 19 February 1914, p 304.
65. 'Buhara Hali Tehlikededir', *Tearifi Müslimin*, 29 April 1910, pp 47–49. As we shall see, this was not the only time that Ikrâm had a gun pointed to his head in a debate.
66. The book was welcomed by the Jadid press in Russia: Hâji Muin ibn Shukrullah, 'Yângi asar', *Turkistân vilâyatining gazeti*, 4 October 1912; Âlimkhân Shakir Khojayev, 'Tanqid-i ähval', *Shura* (Orenburg), 15 May 1916, pp 249–250.
67. TsGARUz, f. 3, op. 2, d. 215, ll. 1–3ob.
68. TsGARUz, f. 461, op. 1, d. 1168, ll. 227–227ob. The search of Râziq's house was reported in *Tearif-i Müslimin*, 30 December 1910.
69. TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 31, d. 792, l. 3; Aynî, *TIB*, p 105.
70. TsGARUz, f. 3, op. 2, d. 215, l. 66. According to this police report (dated 12 December 1913), Râziq died on the way to hajj.
71. See a letter of felicitations, signed by eighteen former students of Mufti Ikrâm now working as new-method teachers in Kokand in *Âyina*, 11 January 1914, 276. Ikrâm's triumph was considered important enough to be reported in a quasi official journal in Istanbul: 'İslâm Hevâdisi: Buhara', *İslâm Mecmuası* , Vol 1, 1914, p 63.
72. TsGARUz, f. 3, op. 3, d. 215, l. 67; GARF, f. 102, op. 244 (1914), d. 365, ll. 9–9ob.
73. Aynî, *TIB*, pp 116–117; *TAMB*, p 145; Fitrat, *Davrai hukmroni*, p 28.
74. Political Agency to Deputy Foreign Minister, 10 July 1914, in TsGARUz, f. 2, op. 1, d. 268, l. 7; Aynî, *TIB*, pp 117–121.
75. TsGARUz, op. 1, d. 268, ll. 3–3ob. The Political Agency rued the fact that supervision of these schools was now next to impossible.
76. Aynî, *TIB*, pp 121–122.
77. Aynî, *TIB*, pp 71–79.
78. Abdurrauf Fitrat, *Bayânât-i sayyâh-i hindî* (Istanbul, 1911).

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